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Abstract 
 
We develop a search-theory of asset market liquidity which gives rise to endogenous financing 
constraints in an otherwise standard dynamic general equilibrium model. Asset liquidity describes the 
ease of issuance and re-saleability of private financial claims for a certain price. We model asset liquidity 
as an outcome of the participation margins of buyers and sellers on an asset market, where financial 
intermediaries implement a costly search-and-matching process. Limited market liquidity of private 
claims creates a role for liquid assets, such as fiat money, to ease financing constraints. We show 
that endogenising liquidity is essential to generate positive co-movement between asset (re)saleability 
and asset prices. When the capacity of the asset market to channel funds to entrepreneurs deteriorates, 
investment falls while the hedging value of liquid assets increases, driving up liquidity premia. Our 
model, thus, demonstrates that shocks to the intermediation capacity of financial markets can be an 
important source of flight-to-liquidity dynamics and macroeconomic fluctuations, matching key business 
cycle characteristics of the U.S. economy. 
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1 Introduction
Asset market liquidity describes the ease with which financial claims can be traded and their
price impact. The frictions associated with asset transactions also motivate the demand for
highly liquid assets, such as fiat money or government bonds, to hedge future liquidity risks.
Investors thus demand a premium for bearing liquidity risks.
Empirical evidence points to countercyclical variation in both liquidity premia and port-
folio shifts towards highly liquid assets.1 Prices across a wide range of financial assets, on
the other hand, are procyclical and volatile. As observed, for instance, during the 2007-
2009 financial crisis, deteriorating asset market liquidity is also a key feature of economic
downturns precipitated by a meltdown in the financial sector.2
How can these dynamic interactions between the macroeconomy and asset markets be
captured in a standard macro model? We address this issue by developing a search theory of
asset market liquidity which gives rise to endogenous financing constraints in general equi-
librium. Money can exist in equilibrium to relax financing constraints. This simple search
theory captures typical asset market imperfections including participation costs, transaction
costs, imperfect competition, and funding constraints observed in micro-level data (see e.g.,
Vayanos and Wang, 2013). In addition, our theory also accounts for the extensive margin
of asset liquidity, i.e., the numbers of trades, and its relationship with asset prices as in the
data. The model embeds a two-way feedback between asset liquidity and macroeconomic
dynamics, which gives rise to endogenous amplification of financial and real shocks.
Our theory of endogenous asset liquidity and financing constraints contrasts with existing
works on dynamic macro-financial interactions, which often involve exogenous shocks oper-
ating directly on agents’ financing constraints. In particular, well-known general equilibrium
models such as Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) introduce a
negative shock to exogenous asset saleability which tightens firms’ financing constraints, but
does not reduce the optimal amount of investment. As a result, assets that remain liquid
record higher prices while the economy slides into recession. The counterfactual response of
asset prices to financial shocks in these frameworks has been documented by Shi (2015).
To avoid this asset pricing anomaly in response to financial shocks, we model asset
1Studies by Huberman and Halka (2001), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Chordia, Sarkar,
and Subrahmanyam (2005), and Naes, Skjeltorp, and Odegaard (2011) assert that market liquidity is pro-
cyclical and highly correlated across asset classes such as bonds and stocks in the US.
2Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012) identify a structural break in the market liquidity of cor-
porate bonds at the onset of the sub-prime crisis. The liquidity component of spreads of all but AAA rated
bonds increased and turnover rates declined, making refinancing more difficult. Similarly, the liquidity of
commercial paper slumped as reported by Anderson and Gascon (2009), with money market mutual funds,
the main investors in the commercial paper market, shifting to highly liquid and secure government securi-
ties. Finally, Gorton and Metrick (2012) show that haircuts on repo markets increased strongly during the
crisis, thus undermining the use of financial paper as collateral repo transactions.
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saleability that depends on asset price directly. Liquidity of privately issued financial assets
is a function of the participation margins of buyers and sellers, which is characterised by a
costly search-and-matching process. Illiquidity of private financial claims creates a role for
money (liquid assets), which provide insurance against future financing constraints. Privately
issued assets must thus pay an endogenous liquidity premium over money.
We find that the cyclical behaviour of asset prices and the liquidity premium depend on
the underlying drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations. Following a persistent fall in aggregate
productivity, asset prices and investment fall. Since there is less investment need, financing
constraints are less tight, and the hedging value of money and, hence, the liquidity premium
fall. Following adverse shocks to intermediation costs in asset markets, however, both asset
saleability and asset prices fall simultaneously, thereby tightening firms’ financing constraints
endogenously and amplifying the initial shocks. Tighter financing constraints increase the
hedging value of money, such that the liquidity premium rises. Our framework, thus, shows
that shocks to the intermediation costs on asset markets are essential to jointly capture the
countercyclical liquidity premium, procyclical and volatile asset prices, and large fluctuations
of macroeconomic variables as observed in the data.
Mechanism. Consider an economy where both money and privately issued financial claim-
s circulate. The latter are backed by the cash flow from physical capital, which is owned
by households and rented to final goods producers. All household members are endowed
with a portfolio of money and private claims. In each period, household members are tem-
porarily separated and face idiosyncratic investment risks. Some become workers, others
entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs have investment opportunities for capital goods creation.
Entrepreneurs can finance investment using their fully liquid cash balances, and they can
tap into private asset markets by issuing new financial claims on their investment projects and
by liquidating their existing portfolio of private assets. Private claims (both new and old) are
only partially liquid. They are traded on a search market where intermediaries offer costly
matching services for buy and sell orders. Only a fraction of quoted orders is successfully
matched each period. This fraction is endogenously determined by the participation intensity
on either side of the market. For instance, the more buy orders are posted relative to sell
orders, the easier it is to match a sell order. This limited saleability of financial claims
captures the quantity dimension of asset liquidity.
Intermediaries determine the transaction price in successful matches by maximizing
the total match surplus, similar to the bargaining process in the labour search literature
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Shimer, 2005). As the match surpluses of buyers and sell-
ers depend on the ease with which private claims can be traded, the transaction price also
depends on the relative asset supply and demand conditions, thus linking the quantity with
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the price dimension of asset liquidity. Finally, the intermediation search cost drives a wedge
between this transaction price and the effective purchase and sale prices.3
In the steady state, fiat money is valued for its liquidity service as long as intermediation
costs are large enough. Private assets then need to pay a liquidity premium over money in
order to compensate investors for carrying liquidity risks. The higher the premium, the lower
is the price of private assets. However, if intermediation costs become too large, sellers stop
offering their assets for sale, such that private asset markets break down and only money
circulates. Therefore, our endogenous asset liquidity framework embeds the inherent fragility
of the financial sector.
Dynamic and Empirical Properties. We consider two types of persistent exogenous shock-
s: an aggregate productivity (TFP) shock and a shock to the intermediation costs. The latter
captures any generic disruption in the financial sector that affects the cost of providing in-
termediation services and, therefore, the provision of private liquidity.
Negative TFP shocks decrease the return to capital, make investment into capital goods
less attractive, and hence crowd out investors from the search market. Adverse interme-
diation cost shocks (that increase search costs) make investment into liquid assets more
attractive as a hedge against future financing constraints. This reduces investors’ incentives
to post costly buy orders.
In either case, the fall in demand on the asset market exceeds that of supply, such that
sell orders have a lower chance of being matched with a buy order. Hence, the saleability
of financial claims decreases. At the same time, the asset price falls as the demand effect
dominates the supply effect. Limited saleability and lower asset prices jointly tighten en-
trepreneurs’ financing constraints, such that fewer resources are transferred to entrepreneurs
in the aggregate. Real investment thus falls and economic activity contracts.
While both shocks generate procyclical asset saleability and prices, only adverse inter-
mediation cost shocks induce a persistent flight to liquidity, manifested in a higher liquidity
premium. Negative TFP shocks depress the expected return on capital, thereby exerting
downward pressure on the profitability of future investment projects. Therefore, investors
have a weak incentive to hedge against future financing constraints. Adverse intermediation
cost shocks, however, do not affect the quality of investment projects as such. Investors
strongly value the hedging service provided by money and rebalance their asset portfolios
accordingly. More active portfolio rebalancing increases asset price volatility.
To confront the model implications for the cyclical properties of asset market liquidity
3A financial system is often characterised by multiple layers of financial intermediaries, such as custodians,
dealers, or market makers (Shen, Wei, and Yan, 2015). These provide costly brokerage, clearing, and
settlement services to attenuate trading fictions. Our costly search-and-matching framework is designed to
capture these generic participation costs arising from financial services.
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with the data, we construct an illiquidity difference measure as a proxy for the liquidity
premium. This measure is based on Amihud (2002), taking into account both volumes and
prices to quantify the degree of asset liquidity. Intermediation cost shocks are able to match
the countercyclical illiquidity difference measure and procyclical, but volatile, asset prices
(in addition to the dynamics of macroeconomic variables) in the U.S. data. TFP shocks,
on the other hand, generate a strongly procyclical liquidity premium, and procyclical, but
insufficiently volatile, asset prices. Liquidity premia thus emerge as a potential discriminant
between financial sector and productivity shocks.
Our paper’s main message can be summarized as follows: when both private assets and
fiat money co-exist, the price of private assets can fall with adverse financial shocks (either
permanent or temporary) if the increase of the liquidity premium dominates the contraction
of asset supply. Falling asset prices, in turn, tighten financing constraints and generate large
aggregate fluctuations as in the data.
Relation to Literature on Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions. By studying interme-
diation cost shocks which affect the financial market directly, we complement the literature
on financial shocks. Recent contributions such as Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Jac-
card (2013) identify financial shocks as an important source of business cycles. Gazzani and
Vicondoa (2016) provide evidence that liquidity shocks in secondary sovereign debt markets
can have potent real effects on firms’ financing constraints.
As regards the analysis of the impact of financial shocks on macroeconomic dynamics,
our framework is related to Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) (henceforth KM) and Shi (2015).
These studies propose models with exogenous differences in the market liquidity between
private claims and government-issued assets to study the macroeconomic impact of liquidity
shocks. Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2016) extend the KM framework with
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates to simulate unconventional monetary policy
in response to an exogenous liquidity crisis.4 Ajello (2012) studies exogenous bid-ask spread
shocks within a New Keynesian framework and KM frictions.
Nevertheless, our search-theory of asset market liquidity differs conceptually from these
studies. First, as we endogenously link asset saleability with asset prices and bid-ask spread-
s, asset liquidity in our framework jointly captures the speed of asset transactions and the
associated costs and price impact. Second, models with exogenous asset market liquidity
ignore the feedback effects transmitted from the real economy to the financial system, while
this paper features a two-way feedback between financial markets and macroeconomic con-
ditions. Finally, the above papers, are plagued by the asset pricing anomalies critiqued by
4The macroeconomic impact of the liquidity freeze during the 2007-2009 financial crisis is also studied by
Radde (2015). Kara and Sin (2013) show that market liquidity frictions induce a trade-off between output
and inflation stabilization off the zero lower bound that can be attenuated by quantitative easing measures.
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Shi (2015), much in contrast to our framework.
Relation to Literature on Asset Market Liquidity. The empirical literature emphasises
trading delays as well as volatile market depth, trading volumes and bid-ask spreads as
salient features of asset markets (Bao, Pan, and Wang, 2011; Gavazza, 2011). As these
features emerge naturally from search frictions, the latter are a logical starting point for
a theory of asset liquidity. The pioneering work of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005)
applies search theory to model trading frictions on over-the-counter (OTC) markets.
This framework has been extended to include general asset holdings (Lagos, Rocheteau,
and Weill, 2011), liquidity provision (Weill, 2007), and markets for a wide range of financial
assets, such as asset-backed securities, corporate bonds, federal funds, private equity and
housing (Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen, 2007; Ashcraft and Duffie, 2007; Feldhutter, 2011;
Wheaton, 1990; Ungerer, 2012). Rocheteau and Weill (2011) provides an extensive survey on
search theory and asset market liquidity. Meanwhile, Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003),
Wasmer and Weil (2004), and Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) have emphasised the
role of search frictions in credit markets and their impact on aggregate dynamics.5
An alternative approach to endogenising asset liquidity focuses on information frictions,
such as the adverse selection models in Eisfeldt (2004) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2014). But
these studies do not consider the feedback effects of liquidity fluctuations on production. Two
notable exceptions are Kurlat (2013) and Bigio (2015), who extend KM with endogenous
resaleability through adverse selection. However, both papers ignore the role of liquid assets,
which may be owed to insufficient tractability. Besides tractability reasons, search can
capture the extensive margin of asset liquidity, i.e., the numbers of trades, and its relationship
with asset prices. This feature allows us to link the model with empirical measures of liquidity
premia as described above.
Search-theoretic models of money, such as Shi (1995), Trejos and Wright (1995), Lagos
and Wright (2005), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009) have
highlighted the importance of money for transaction purposes on anonymous search markets.
The framework has been extended to analyse asset liquidity and pricing with multiple types
of assets (Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright, 2012), privately created liquid assets (Lagos and
Rocheteau, 2008), trading delays with market makers (Lagos and Zhang, 2016), and bank-
deposits (Williamson, 2012). Rocheteau (2011) shows that the trading restrictions from
the money-search framework can be derived from tractable microfoundations exploiting the
relative information-sensitivity of different financial assets.
Our model differs from these studies in that private claims are subject to search frictions
5Further, Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2006) study search frictions associated with physical capital
in a macroeconomic setting. As shown in Beaubrun-Diant and Tripier (2013), search frictions also help
explain salient business cycle features of bank lending relationships.
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themselves, rather than serving to overcome search frictions on the goods market. More
importantly, we consider endogenous supply of financial assets tied to physical investment
and production in a standard business cycle model. The model thus features liquidity and
financing constraints on primary and secondary asset markets,6 liquid assets as the lubricant
of investment financing, and feedback effects between asset liquidity and the real economy.
In this regard, our paper is related to Yang (2014) and Cao and Shi (2014), which apply
search theory to asset or capital markets. In Yang (2014), TFP shocks can generate co-
movement between asset liquidity and prices similar to our model. However, we show that
asset prices are not sufficiently volatile in response to TFP shocks compared to the data. In
addition, TFP shocks generate a pro- rather than countercyclical liquidity premium. Cao
and Shi (2014) emphasize capital reallocation, while we focus on asset pricing implications
of asset liquidity and liquidity premium.
Finally, while sharing similarities, this paper differs along important dimensions from Cui
and Radde (2016). First, the latter introduces directed search and intermediation chains on
asset markets in contrast to the random search approach used here. Second, the latter model
exhibits equilibrium multiplicity, thereby compromising its tractability. Third, Cui and
Radde (2016) does not offer insights into the dynamic behaviour of asset liquidity including
the distinct role of financial shocks as an important source of business cycles.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and infinite (t = 0, 1, 2, ...). The economy has three sectors: final good-
s producers, households, and financial intermediaries. There is a continuum of identical
households (with measure one) and each household has a continuum of members. Similar to
Shi (2015) and Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2016), we use the big family
structure to simplify aggregation.
2.1 Timing
Each period is divided into four sub-periods:
The Household’s Decision Period. Aggregate shocks to productivity (At) and intermedi-
ation costs (κt) are realized. Types are still unknown and all members in a representative
household equally divide the household’s assets. The household instructs its members on
their type-contingent decisions.
6In this sense, we complement the studies of cyclical capital reallocation, such as Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2006) and Cui (2013).
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The Production Period. Each member receives a status draw, becoming an entrepreneur
with probability χ and a worker otherwise. The type-draw is independent across members
and over time. An entrepreneur has investment projects but no labour endowment, while
a worker has a unit of labour endowment but no investment project. Both groups are
temporarily separated during each period and there is no consumption risk insurance among
them. Competitive firms rent aggregate capital stock Kt and hire aggregate labour Nt from
households to produce output (consumption goods) according to a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Yt = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t ,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and At measures exogenous aggregate productivity. The profit-maximizing
rental rate and wage rate are thus
rt = αAt
(
Kt
Nt
)α−1
and wt = (1− α)At
(
Kt
Nt
)α
. (1)
The Investment Period. Entrepreneurs use their return from capital and liquid assets, and
seek further external funding to finance scalable investment projects, which can transform
one unit of consumption goods into one unit of capital stock. Liquid assets, traded on a
spot market, are fiat money in fixed supply with B¯. Money is accepted by everyone in the
economy, and the price is thus determined by the demand for liquid assets. Entrepreneurs
sell private claims to the cash flow from their investment projects through intermediaries
to workers (in exchange for consumption goods). The asset market, on which such claims
are traded, is characterized by search frictions. Financial intermediaries implement a costly
matching process in the asset market and determine the transaction price.
The Consumption Period. After investment, agents of both types consume. Then, they
return to their households with their assets and pool these assets together.
2.2 A Representative Household
Let cit denote the consumption of an individual entrepreneur, and c
n
t and nt denote the
consumption and hours worked of an individual worker.
Preferences. The household aggregates the utility of consumption and the dis-utility of
labour supply from all its members according to
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{χu(cit) + (1− χ)u(cnt )− (1− χ)h(nt)},
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s discount factor, the expectation is taken over aggre-
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gate shocks (At, κt), u(.) is a standard strictly increasing and concave utility function of
consumption, and h(.) captures the dis-utility derived from labour supply nt ∈ [0, 1].
Balance Sheet. Households can invest into nominal and fully liquid assets (money) with a
nominal price Pt. Physical capital (K
h
t ) held by households is rented to final goods producers,
earning a rental return rt. Entrepreneurs can issue equity claims to the future returns on
newly created capital. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), we normalize one unit of issued
assets to be a claim on the stream of future returns on one unit of investment at time t,
which amounts to: rt, (1− δ)rt+1, (1− δ)2rt+2, ....
In general, a household has three kinds of assets: liquid assets (Bt); financial claims on
other households’ return on capital (SOt ); and own physical capital (K
h
t ). These assets are
financed by net worth and private financial claims issued to outside investors (SIt ), backed
by a fraction of the households’ own physical capital. This financing structure gives rise to
the beginning-of-period balance sheet in Table 1. It turns out that, besides liquid assets Bt,
we only need to keep track of net private financial claims St, defined as
St ≡ financial claims on other households’ capital + unissued capital
= SOt + (K
h
t − SIt ).
To see this, let qt be the transaction price of a private financial claim. Both existing claims
to capital (i.e., SOt ) and the fraction of the capital stock on which no financial claims have
been written yet (i.e., Kht −SIt ) could be offered on the search market, and both the saleable
parts are valued at qt. Therefore, we can focus on St alone.
Table 1: A Household’s Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
liquid assets holding Bt/Pt financial claims issued qtS
I
t
financial claims-
on other households’ capital qtS
O
t
capital qtK
h
t net worth qtSt +Bt/Pt
Asset Accumulation. Let Sjt and B
j
t denote net private financial claims and money held
by entrepreneurs (j = i) or workers (j = n). Let Sjt+1 and B
j
t+1 denote the end-of-period
asset positions at t. Since all financial assets are equally divided, the fraction of private
claims held by entrepreneurs and workers corresponds to their respective population shares,
i.e., Sit = χSt, S
n
t = (1− χ)St, Bit = χBt, and Bnt = (1− χ)Bt.
To simplify, we use recursive notation and omit time t in subscripts from now on. The
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size of end-of-period net private financial claims satisfies
Sj+1 = (1− δ)Sj + Ij −M j, (2)
where Ij is physical investment, and M j corresponds to the quantity of private claims sold
by group j members. When M j is negative, group j members are buying private claims.
Workers’ Constraints. The household delegates purchases of private claims to workers,
because they earn a wage rate w and do not have investment opportunities (In = 0). There-
fore, workers post bid quotes (i.e., purchase orders) of size V through financial intermediaries
to acquire new or old private claims at a unit search cost κ. On the search market, each
bid is matched with an ask quote by financial intermediaries with an endogenous proba-
bility f ∈ [0, 1], such that an individual buyer expects to purchase an amount fV (or sell
Mn = −fV ). Workers’ flow-of-funds constraint in terms of consumption goods reads
Cn + κV + qfV +
Bn+1
P
= wN + r(1− χ)S + (1− χ)B
P
, (3)
where Cn = (1 − χ)ci and N = (1 − χ)n. That is, labour income, the return on private
claims, and money are used to finance consumption, search costs, and the new acquisition
of private claims and money. Finally, workers cannot issue money:
Bn+1 ≥ 0. (4)
Entrepreneurs’ Constraints. In order to finance new investment (I i > 0), entrepreneurs
can use return on their claims on capital and liquid assets; they can also post ask quotes (i.e.,
sales quotes) of a size U , backed by private financial claims, for sale at the unit search cost
κ. These assets include existing net private claims (1− δ)χS, plus claims on new investment
I i:
U ≤ (1− δ)χS + I i. (5)
U is bounded from above, because entrepreneurs may not respect the delivery of assets after
receiving payments. Therefore, intermediaries ensure that all quotes are backed by capital; if
entrepreneurs default, intermediaries can seize the assets. Ask quotes are matched with bid
quotes with the - endogenously determined - probability φ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, entrepreneurs
expect to sell M i = φU units of financial claims, and their flow-of-funds constraint is
Ci + κU + I i − qφU + B
i
+1
P
= rχS +
χB
P
, (6)
where Ci = χci. That is, the returns on private claims and money are used to finance
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consumption, search costs, physical investment not funded by the revenue from asset issuance
and reselling, and end-of-period money holdings. Similar to workers, entrepreneurs cannot
issue money
Bi+1 ≥ 0. (7)
The Household’s Problem. Let J (S,B; Γ) be the value of the representative household
with net private financial claims S, money holdings B, given the aggregate state variable
Γ ≡ (K, B¯;A, κ). Since at the end of period t, workers and entrepreneurs reunite to share
their stocks of private claims and money, we have
S+1 = S
i
+1 + S
n
+1 = (1− δ)S + I i − φU + fV, (8)
B+1 = B
i
+1 +B
n
+1. (9)
where we know end-of-period asset holdings Si+ = (1− δ)χS+ I i−φU and Sn+ = (1− δ)(1−
χ)S + fV from equation (2). The value J(S,B; Γ) satisfies the following Bellman equation
J(S,B; Γ) = max
{N,Ci,Cn,Ii,U,V,Bi+1,Bn+1}
{
χu
(
Ci
χ
)
+ (1− χ)u
(
Cn
1− χ
)
− (1− χ)h
(
N
1− χ
)
+ βE [J(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ]
}
, subject to (3)− (9).
2.3 Asset Search and Matching
Unlike money, privately issued financial assets typically have heterogeneous characteristics
and may only attract investors with specific knowledge or investment strategies. Finding a
counterpart to trade private financial assets can, therefore, be difficult. Financial intermedi-
ation helps address these information asymmetries and trading frictions in order to channel
funds from savers to borrower. Even when conducted through decentralised markets, this
process typically involves the costly services of financial agents. Costs related to financial
intermediation may arise, for instance, from brokerage and settlement services offered by
dealers and market makers on OTC markets, legal and advertising costs related to IPOs or
fees collected by rating agencies.
In our framework, we capture these features through the costly search-and-matching
process described below, where financial intermediaries operate the matching technology,
determine the transaction price in successful matches, and settle the trade, thus performing
the functions of financial agents in the market-based intermediation process.7
7Alternatively, the intermediation process could be regarded as bank-based, with financial intermediaries
being interpreted as banks offering costly screening and monitoring services and channeling funds from
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Financial Intermediaries. Intermediaries collect bid quotes V from workers and ask
quotes U from entrepreneurs. They verify that ask quotes are fully backed by capital. Then,
they implement the matching technology against a participation - or intermediation - cost
of κ per unit of the quoted quantities paid by buyers and sellers. Only a fraction of bid and
ask quotes are successfully matched.
Search and Matching. The technology operated by financial intermediaries takes the form
of a matching function, which is concave and homogeneous of degree 1 in (U, V ) space:
M(U, V ) = ξUηV 1−η, (10)
where ξ captures matching efficiency and η ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity w.r.t. ask quotes. Let
θ = V/U denote asset market tightness from buyers’ perspective. Then,
φ =
M(U, V )
U
= M(1, θ) and f =
M(U, V )
V
= M(θ−1, 1)
are the probability that one unit of the ask quotes can be sold and the probability that one
unit of the bid quotes can be purchased. Since φt also represents the fraction of financial
assets that can be sold ex post in a given period, we refer to φt as asset saleability.
The above Cobb-Douglas matching function reflects the fact that as asset market tight-
ness θ increases, it becomes easier for the sellers to find potential buyers (i.e., φ increases),
whereas buyers have more difficulty in finding appropriate investment opportunities (i.e., f
decreases). The opposite is true, when θ goes to zero.
Asset Prices. For simplicity, we refer to the price of private claims as “the” asset price.
The transaction price of private claims is determined by a bargaining process, which sellers
and buyers delegate to financial intermediaries. Therefore, once a unit of assets offered for
sale is matched to a buy quote, intermediaries offer a price qt to both parties. This price is
chosen to maximizing the total surplus of the trade by bargaining on behalf of each side. As
the amount of matched assets M j is predetermined at the point of bargaining, buyers and
sellers interact at the margin.
Buyers’ and Sellers’ Marginal Surpluses. Denote by Jn and J i the marginal transac-
tion surpluses of individual workers (buyers) and entrepreneurs (sellers). A buyer’s surplus
amounts to
Jn(S,B; Γ) = −u′
(
Cnt
1− χ
)
q + βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] , (11)
depositors to borrowers as in De-Fiore and Uhlig (2011). In the interest of tractability and to preserve the
generic nature of the intermediation process, we refrain, however, from modeling financial intermediaries’
balance sheets more explicitly.
12
which consists of the resources sacrificed today to acquire an additional unit of private claims
and the value of this additional unit of asset holdings to its household tomorrow.8
Similarly, a seller’s surplus is the marginal value to the household of an additional match
for entrepreneurs. However, the sellers’ surplus differs from that of buyers’, because, unlike
workers, entrepreneurs need to implement physical investment after a successful transaction.
To see this, we express ask quotes as U = e [(1− δ)χS + I i], where e ∈ [0, 1] according to
the financing constraint (5). Then, a seller’s surplus is given by
J i(S,B; Γ) = u′
(
Ci
χ
)
q − βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] (12)
+e−1φ−1
[
−u′
(
Ci
χ
)
+ βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ]
]
The first line in equation (12) mirrors the buyers’ surplus with inverted signs: the first term
is the marginal value of the additional resources obtained through the transaction, while
the second captures the loss to the household on account of the reduction of tomorrow’s
asset holdings. The second line reflects the fact that entrepreneurs need to implement the
households’ investment plan. Moreover, financial intermediaries monitor the implementation
of these investment plans in order to ensure that ask quotes are ex ante credibly backed
by capital. Given the matching technology (10), entrepreneurs sell claims amounting to
M i = φU = φe [(1− δ)χS + I i]. Hence, entrepreneurs need to invest ∂I i/∂M i = e−1φ−1 per
unit of resources obtained in a successful match, which reduces marginal consumption today
by e−1φ−1 while increasing tomorrow’s equity position also by e−1φ−1.
Importantly, the asymmetry in buyers’ and sellers’ surpluses reflects the fact that the
model features endogenous supply on the asset market, which is a key innovation of the
search framework. For a detailed derivation, see Appendix A.1.
“Bargaining”. Note that all members within the groups of buyers and sellers are ho-
mogeneous, such that the type-specific valuations are identical in all matched pairs. Then,
intermediaries set a price q to maximize
max
q
{(J i)ω(Jn)1−ω} (13)
where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of the surplus that goes to sellers. This set-up is similar to
bilateral (generalized) Nash bargaining between buyers and sellers over the match surplus. In
the bilateral bargaining case, ω is the bargaining power of sellers. Our set-up differs, however,
8Note that search market participation costs are already sunk at the bargaining stage. However, search
costs are not ignored since households take them into account when determining optimal asset posting
decisions by workers and entrepreneurs.
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in that intermediaries bargain on behalf of household members, such that household members
do not think they can influence the asset price.9
2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Having described the environment, we proceed with the equilibrium definition. A recursive
competitive equilibrium consists of a mapping of state variables (K, A, κ) → (K+1,
A+1, κ+1) and equilibrium objects that are functions of the state variables: a value function
J(S,B,Γ), policy functions for consumption, investment, labour, and portfolio choices {Ci,
Cn, N , I i, e, U , V , Bi+1, B
n
+1}, asset market features {θ, φ, f}, and a collection of prices
{P , q, w, r}, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) final goods producers’ optimality conditions in (1) hold;
(ii) given prices, the value function and the policy functions solve the representative
household’s decision problem, with e defined as e ≡ U/ [(1− δ)χS + I i];
(iii) θ ∈ [0,+∞) and the asset price q solves (13);
(iv) the capital market clears: K+1 = (1− δ)K + I i and S = K; the search market
“clears”: φ = M(1, θ) and f = M(θ−1, 1); and the money market clears: B+1 = B = B¯;
(v) aggregate productivity A and intermediation costs κ follow some exogenous processes.
To verify that Walras’ Law holds, we notice that entrepreneurs’ and workers’ budget
constraints (3) and (6), together with (9) and the equilibrium conditions in (iv), imply the
aggregate resource constraint
C + I + κ(V + U) = AKαN1−α = Y, (14)
where aggregate consumption is C = Ci+Cn and aggregate investment I = I i. For account-
ing purposes, gross investment expenditure is defined as I + κ(V + U), of which only (net)
investment I adds to the aggregate capital stock at time t+ 1.
3 Equilibrium Characterisation
Money (public liquidity) is fully saleable, while private claims (private liquidity) are only
partially convertible into consumption goods in each period due to the costly search-and-
matching process. As a result, the equilibrium described in the previous section admits
different types, which can be distinguished by the activity of asset markets and the kind of
financial assets that circulate.
9In this sense, our price setting is similar to the wage determining process in Ravn (2008) and Ebell (2011),
where individual workers come to bargain on behalf of their respective households. That is, households take
asset prices as given and the strategic bargaining issue from Rauch (2000) and Zhu (2008) do not arise.
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One polar case is autarky, i.e., an equilibrium in which neither private claims nor money
exist.10 We restrict our attention to the more realistic case of a non-autarky economy in which
at least one type of financial claims circulates. For ease of exposition, we first characterise
the economy with κ > 0 and with both private and public liquidity. We defer the discussion
of the conditions for an equilibrium featuring the co-existence of both types of assets versus
the existence of only one type to Section 4.2.
3.1 Simplified Household’s Constraints
Simplified Flow-of-Funds Constraints. It is convenient to use the notion of effective buy and
sell prices. We define the effective buy (or bid) price per unit of private claims as
qn ≡ q + κ
f
, (15)
where q captures the transaction price and κ/f represents search costs per transaction (scaled
by the probability of encountering a matching ask quote f). Symmetrically to the bid price,
we define the effective sell (or ask) price of a unit of private financial assets as
qi ≡ q − κ
φ
. (16)
Note that qi is also equal to Tobin’s q: the ratio of the market value of capital to its
replacement cost (i.e., unity).
When κ > 0, the ask price is below the transaction price. Hence, entrepreneurs not only
face constraints regarding the quantity of private claims that can be issued and resold, but
also have to sell at a discount due to the intermediation cost κ/φ when liquidating financial
claims. One may further intrepret qn − qi = κ(f−1 + φ−1) as the bid-ask spread. Therefore,
our quantity measure of asset liquidity φ is closely linked with the bid ask spread, a price
measure of asset liquidity.
Notice that (15) and (16) are helpful to transform the budget constraints (3) and (6). By
using the definitions of the effective prices (15) and (16), together with the laws of motion
of private asset positions (2) and Mn = −fV and M i = φU , we can rewrite the workers’
flow-of-funds constraint (3) and the entrepreneurs’ flow-of-funds constraint (6) as
Cn + qnSn+1 +
Bn+1
P
= wN + [r + (1− δ)qn] (1− χ)S + (1− χ)B
P
, (17)
10Such a complete breakdown of financial transactions on the private asset market may be self-fulfilling.
For instance, when one party of the market does not participate, the other party would expect this inaction
and stay out of the search market, validating the initial non-participation decision of their counterparts.
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Ci + I i + qi
[
Si+1 − (1− δ)χS − I i
]
+
Bi+1
P
= rχS +
χB
P
. (18)
We can further simplify (18) by substituting out investment. Again, we use U = e[(1−
δ)χS + I i], where e ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of total assets quoted for sale. Following equation
(2), the evolution of entrepreneurs’ private asset holdings then becomes
Si+1 = (1− eφ)
[
(1− δ)χS + I i] . (19)
By using (19), we can express investment as I i = Si+1/(1 − eφ) − (1 − δ)χS. Finally,
substituting investment out of equation (18), entrepreneurs’ flow-of-funds constraint becomes
Ci + qrSi+1 +
Bi+1
P
= rχS + (1− δ)χS + χB
P
, (20)
where qr ≡ 1− eφq
i
1− eφ . (21)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (20) captures entrepreneurs’ spending on consumption good-
s and holdings of private claims and money, while the right-hand side (RHS) represents
entrepreneurial (total) net worth including rental income from capital, the value of exist-
ing financial claims, and the real value of money. On the LHS, end-of-period private asset
holdings are valued at qr, which is the effective replacement cost of private claims to en-
trepreneurs: for every unit of investment, entrepreneurs sell a fraction eφ of claims on the
search market at price qi, thus obtaining outside funding amounting to eφqi. Hence, they on-
ly need to finance the “down-payment” (1−eφqi) per unit of investment out of their own net
worth. Moreover, entrepreneurs retain only a fraction (1− eφ) of all claims created against
an additional unit of investment as inside equity, such that they need (1− eφqi)/ (1− eφ) to
acquire one unit of next-period private claims. The smaller is qr, the larger is the amount
of private claims Si+1, which entrepreneurs can bring back to their family.
In sum, (17) and (20) are the simplified budget constraints. Next, we turn to the discus-
sion of financing constraints.
Simplified Financing Constraints. Workers cannot create new financial claims as they
lack investment projects. Moreover, they would incur losses if they sold their existing stock
of private financial assets due to the costs involved in divesting assets via the search market.
Therefore, the accumulation of financial assets - including private claims - on behalf of the
household is delegated to workers. The workers’ financing constraint (4) is thus slack.
Entrepreneurs face two financing constraints (5) and (7), i.e., e ≤ 1 and Bi+1 ≥ 0. Again,
e ≤ 1 follows from the convenient expression U = e [(1− δ)χS + I]. To understand these
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constraints, it is instructive to back out aggregate investment I ≡ I i from (19) and (20):
I =
[r + eφqi(1− δ)]χS + χB
P
− Ci − Bi+1
Pt
1− eφqi ≤
[r + φqi(1− δ)]χS + χB
P
− Ci
1− φqi . (22)
To invest in new capital stock, entrepreneurs’ liquid net worth [r + eφqi(1− δ)]χS + χB/P
, net of consumption and newly purchased liquid assets, can be leveraged at (1− eφqi)−1. If
both financing constraints bind with equality, the RHS of (22) determines the upper bound
on investment I.11 That is, the two constraints e ≤ 1 (or U ≤ (1− δ)χS + I) and Bi+1 ≥ 0
imply a constraint on investment I.
Next, we check whether entrepreneurs’ financing constraints are binding. A necessary
condition for private claims to exist is that the replacement cost is bounded above by the
internal cost of creating private claims, i.e., qr ≤ 1. Otherwise, entrepreneurs would finance
investment fully out of internal funds. In equilibrium, the assumption of nonzero search
costs and qr ≤ 1 imply, by definition, that qn > q > qi ≥ 1. In other words, the ask price qi
on the search market (weakly) exceeds entrepreneurs’ internal cost of investment, such that
the issuance of financial claims against new investment yields non-negative profits.
Therefore, the representative household will prompt entrepreneurs to spend whatever net
worth they are not consuming on creating new financial claims. These entrepreneurs sell as
many private financial assets as possible and divest their entire stock of money holdings, i.e.,
e = 1 (or U = (1− δ)χS + I) and Bi+1 = 0. That is, entrepreneurs’ financing constraints are
binding and investment is bounded from above as in (22).
3.2 The Household’s Optimal Decisions
Now, we know that the household maximizes J(S,B; Γ) subject to (17), (20), (8), (9), by
choosing labour supply N , consumption Ci and Cn, e = 1, total private financial claims Si+1
and Sn+1, and liquid assets B
i
+1 = 0 and B
n
+1. These choices are discussed in the following.
Labour Choice. The first-order condition for labour from this optimisation problem is
u′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
w = h′
(
N
1− χ
)
, (23)
which is a standard intra-period optimality condition. It requires that the marginal gain of
extra consumption goods from earning wages equal the marginal dis-utility from working.
Portfolio Choice and Risk Sharing. We now turn to the optimal portfolio choices for
11Note that ∂I/∂e > 0, as a higher fraction of assets posted on the search market increases the amount
of outside funding (numerator effect), thereby increasing the leverage ratio, i.e. decreasing the denominator.
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private financial claims and money. The first-order conditions for Si+1 and S
n
+1 read
qnu′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
= qru′
(
Ci
χ
)
= βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] , (24)
where JS denotes the partial derivative of J w.r.t. S. Then, the allocation of consumption
between entrepreneurs and workers satisfies
u′
(
Ci
χ
)
= ρu′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
, (25)
where ρ is inversely related to risk-sharing among household members and measures the
impact of financing frictions on consumption risk sharing:
ρ ≡ q
n
qr
. (26)
To see this, suppose that idiosyncratic risks can be fully insured, as in a standard real
business cycle (RBC) model. In this case, entrepreneurs are not financing constrained and
can implement the first-best investment schedule, such that the market price of private claims
equals its internal replacement cost. This would imply that q = qi = qr = qn = 1. In such
an unconstrained economy, entrepreneurs do not need to restrain themselves and are able to
implement the same consumption level as workers. Therefore, full insurance implies ρ = 1.
In contrast, in an economy where idiosyncratic labour income and investment risks are not
fully insurable, entrepreneurs cannot finance the first-best investment schedule. The market
price of private assets remains above its replacement cost, such that ρ > 1. Because of the
concavity of u(.), we have Ci/χ < Cn/(1−χ), i.e., entrepreneurs consume less than workers
in order to expand investment.
Next, using equation (25), we know from the envelope condition that JS satisfies
JS(S,B; Γ) = u
′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
[χρ (r + 1− δ) + (1− χ) (r + (1− δ)qn)] . (27)
Combining equations (24) and (27) yields the asset pricing formula (Euler equation) for
private claims
E
βu′
(
Cn+1
1−χ
)
u′
(
Cn
1−χ
) [χρ+1rni+1 + (1− χ)rnn+1] |Γ
 = 1, (28)
where the term χρ+1r
ni
+1 + (1 − χ)rnn+1 in the expectations operator captures the expected
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return on private claims from the perspective of the household, and
rni+1 ≡
r+1 + (1− δ)
qn
and rnn+1 ≡
r+1 + (1− δ)qn+1
qn
denote the returns from an individual worker’s perspective for the case of becoming an
entrepreneur next period
(
rni+1
)
or staying a worker
(
rnn+1
)
. These returns reflect the fact that
the unit price of private claims for workers in the current period is qn, while the value of one
unit of private claims next period is 1 for entrepreneurs and qn+1 for workers according to the
budget constraints (17) and (20).
To understand the return from the perspective of the household χρ+1r
ni
+1 + (1 − χ)rnn+1,
recall that an entrepreneur’s marginal utility of consumption is ρ+1 times that of a worker. If
a period-t worker becomes an entrepreneur at time t+1 (which happens with probability χ),
the household’s return on holding one unit of private assets is ρ+1r
ni
+1, since the household
values each unit of next-period resources in the hands of entrepreneurs at ρ+1. If the worker
does not change type at time t + 1 (which happens with probability 1 − χ), the return
on private claims is rnn+1. Therefore, the return from the perspective of the household is
χρ+1r
ni
+1 + (1− χ)rnn+1.
Following similar steps, we derive another asset pricing formula for money:
u′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
1
P
= βE [JB (S+1, B+1; Γ+1) |Γ] = βE
[
u′
(
Cn+1
1− χ
)
χρ+1 + 1− χ
P+1
|Γ
]
,
where JB denotes the partial derivative of J w.r.t. B. Therefore,
E
βu′
(
Cn+1
1−χ
)
u′
(
Cn
1−χ
) [χρ+1 1
Π+1
+ (1− χ) 1
Π+1
]
|Γ
 = 1 where Π+1 ≡ P+1
Pt
. (29)
Note that the return on holding money is the inverse of inflation Π+1, while the return on
money from the household’s point of view is (χρ+1 + 1− χ) /Π+1. The return accruing to a
future entrepreneur is, again, adjusted by ρ+1.
3.3 The Asset Price
Bargaining Solution. Financial intermediaries determine the asset price to maximize the
total match surplus of buyers and sellers. The sufficient and necessary first-order condition
associated with the bargaining problem (13) is
ωJn(S,B; Γ) = (1− ω)J i(S,B; Γ). (30)
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By using the household’s optimality condition for asset holdings (24) and the risk-sharing
condition (25), we can derive an analytical solution for the asset price:
Proposition 1:
Suppose that private claims exist. The bargaining solution for the asset price simplifies to
ρ =
ω
1− ωθ. (31)
Alternatively, (31) can be solved for the asset price as
q =
ρ
(
1 + κ
ω
)− κ
f
1 + (ρ− 1)φ . (32)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 1 is our main analytical result linking the asset price with search costs and
asset saleability.12 Importantly, the equilibrium on the market for private claims is not
simply determined by a market clearing condition and the Euler equation for these assets, as
it requires the asset price and asset market tightness (or asset saleability φ) to be pinned down
simultaneously. The bargaining solution (31) solves this issue by establishing a relationship
between asset saleability and the asset price.13
Market Participation. Equation (31) is, in fact, a participation condition, which is similar
to the entry conditions commonly found in the asset search literature (Rocheteau and Weill,
2011; Vayanos and Wang, 2007). To be specific, if the Euler equation for private assets
determines the asset price, then demand and supply conditions as captured by asset market
tightness θ need to be such that (31) is satisfied in order to induce individual agents to
participate in the market. We can see the participation decision by rewriting (31) as
(1− ω)qnM
ωqrM
= θ =
κV
κU
,
where the LHS captures the ratio of the valuation of asset transactions by buyers and sellers,
weighted by their respective bargaining weights; the RHS is the ratio of participation costs
of buyers (κV ) and sellers (κU). In sum, buyers and sellers increase their ask and bid sizes
until the ratio of gains and costs from participation are equal on either side of the market.14
12Although we do not solve explicitly for asset market tightness θ, ask size V , and bid size U , these could
be easily backed out from (31) with the laws of motion of Si and Sn.
13As a comparison, in a traditional asset pricing model, the Euler equation of the investors will determine
the asset price, given their consumption profiles. Assets have full liquidity and φ = 1.
14One can interpret V as the amount of capital inflow into the asset market, which is akin to the concept
of “funding liquidity” in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). As θ = ξ
1
η−1φ
1
1−η is also related to market
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3.4 A Summary
From the above characterisation, our costly-search model captures many aspects of asset
market frictions. First, there are participation costs and transaction costs, and the total costs
are determined by sell and buy orders U and V . The endogenous participation decisions,
unlike free entry conditions, feature imperfect competition within the buyers’ group or the
sellers’ group. Finally, because financing constraints are tied to asset saleability, the search
theory also captures the funding condition in asset markets.
The final step to characterise the equilibrium is to eliminate the type specific asset posi-
tions, and derive a single household budget constraint. We sum over the type-specific budget
constraints (17) and (20), multiplying the latter by ρ; we further eliminate Si+1, S
n
+1, B
i
+1,
and Bn+1, by using e = 1 and B
i
+1 = 0; we finally use (8) and (9), and replace S by K:
ρCi + Cn + qnK+1 +
B+1
P
= wN + [χρ+ (1− χ)] rK
+ [χρ+ (1− χ)qn] (1− δ)K + [χρ+ (1− χ)] B
P
. (33)
This household budget constraint and the investment equation (22) represent the original
workers’ and entrepreneurs’ budget constraints (17) and (20).
The recursive competitive equilibrium can then be summarized as a function (K+1, I,
φ, q, P ) of the aggregate states (K, A, κ), which satisfies the optimality conditions for the
rental and wage rates in (1), the household’s budget constraints and optimality conditions
(22), (33), (23), (25), (28), and (29), financial market equilibrium conditions (15), (16), (26),
and (32), and capital accumulation K+1 = (1−δ)K+I, given B+1 = B¯ and the law of motion
of the exogenous shocks A and κ. See Appendix A.2 for a collection of these conditions.
These equations, involving macroeconomic quantities, the nominal price level, as well as
asset saleability and the asset price, imply rich macro-financial interactions.
4 The Dimensions of Asset Liquidity
Having characterised the equilibrium conditions, we now turn to its implications for asset
liquidity. Our notion of asset liquidity has three dimensions: i) the speed at which an asset
can be converted into consumption goods; ii) the cost incurred during the conversion; iii)
the price impact of trading the asset. All three dimensions interact and jointly affect the
liquidity of private claims as argued below, whereas liquid assets are traded on a frictionless
liquidity φt, our framework thus provide the two-way interaction between “funding liquidity” and “market
liquidity” in an otherwise standard general equilibrium setting.
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spot market and can be converted into consumption goods instantly and costlessly with
minimal price impact.
4.1 Liquidity Premium, Asset Saleability, and the Asset Price
Liquidity Premium. Importantly, when ρ > 1, the asset pricing formulae (28) and (29) imply
that private claims carry a liquidity premium, which compensates investors for impediments
to trading these assets. For simplicity, we illustrate the liquidity premium by focusing on
deterministic steady-state values. Let x¯ be the steady-state value of a variable x.
When money is valued, Π¯ = 1 in the steady state. From the optimality condition for
money holdings (29), we must have
ρ¯ = ρ∗ ≡ χ−1[β−1 − (1− χ)] > 1,
where ρ∗ is a parameter that denotes the degree of risk-sharing in the steady state in which
money is valued. As shown in the first-order condition (25), individual entrepreneurs are
financing constrained and consume less than workers if ρ¯ > 1. Then, the real interest rate
on liquid assets Π¯−1 = 1 is lower than the rate of time preference β−1 in such a constrained
economy.15 By providing a liquidity service, money mitigates financing constraints when
workers become entrepreneurs and is, therefore, valued by them.
We define the premium that private financial assets carry as the difference between the
returns on private claims and money
∆LP ≡ E [χrni+1 + (1− χ)rnn+1|Γt]− E [Π−1+1|Γ] .
In the steady state without aggregate risks, a positive wedge ∆¯LP between the returns on
private claims and money reflects pure liquidity frictions. ∆¯LP is thus the liquidity premium.
Proposition 2:
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state and that both private claims and money
exist. Then, r¯nn > 1 and money provides a liquidity service in the neighbourhood around
the steady state. The steady state liquidity premium amounts to
∆¯LP =
[
1− (ρ∗)−1] (r¯nn − 1) (1− χ) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
15Although we focus on fiat money, similar results obtain in an economy where the government issues
interest-bearing securities as shown in Cui (2016) .
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Proposition 2 has profound implications for the interaction between asset liquidity and
the underlying state of the economy. To illustrate these interactions, we first focus on the
impact of a permanent increase in search costs κ on asset prices and asset market liquidity
in the long-run and, secondly, on the dynamic effect of aggregate shocks on the price and
quantity dimensions of asset liquidity.
Long-run Impact of Search Costs. Consider the steady state of an economy, in which
money is valued. Then, we know from the previous discussion that ρ∗ = χ−1[β−1−(1−χ)] >
1, and Proposition 1 implies that search market tightness is pinned down by the equilibrium
level of risk-sharing, θ¯ = (1−ω)ω−1ρ∗. Since both asset saleability φ = M (1, θ) and purchase
probability f = M (θ−1, 1) are functions of asset market tightness θ only, Proposition 1 also
implies that the equilibrium relationship between q and κ can be directly determined:
Corollary 1:
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state and that both private claims and money
co-exist. Then, asset market tightness satisfies θ¯ = 1−ω
ω
ρ∗. Suppose, further, that
intermediation costs κ increase permanently. If the new equilibrium still features the
co-existence of both types of assets, then the increase of κ in the steady state
1. does not affect asset saleability φ¯ or the purchase probability f¯ and, hence, increases
the bid-ask spread ∆¯s ≡ q¯n − q¯i = κ (φ¯−1 + f¯−1); it increases the bid price q¯n, i.e.
∂q¯n
∂κ
> 0, while it decreases the ask price q¯i, i.e., ∂q¯
i
∂κ
< 0;
2. increases the liquidity premium ∆¯LP ;
3. decreases the asset price q¯, i.e., ∂q¯
∂κ
< 0, if and only if
M(1, θ¯) = M
(
1,
1− ω
ω
ρ∗
)
< 1− ω. (A1)
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
An increase of search costs always raises the bid-ask spread and liquidity premium. Note
that sellers will never be able to recover the increased intermediation costs fully, such that
the ask price q¯i always decreases with κ. The questions is whether the asset price q¯ can fall
with κ. (A1) implies that the answer is positive.
To understand (A1), note that an increase in κ implies that entrepreneurs have to spend
more resources to engage in private asset transactions, such that their financing constraints
tighten. As a result, the supply of private claims on the search market and aggregate
investment fall, while the marginal product of capital (MPK) increases, exerting upward
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pressure on the asset price q. At the same time, demand for private claims will fall. If
money circulates, higher search costs drive buyers into the money market, pushing up the
liquidity premium and putting downward pressure on q.
The latter effect dominates the former if the demand side is more sensitive to changes
in κ than the supply side, i.e., when assumption (A1) is satisfied M(1, θ¯) < 1 − ω and the
market is relatively tight.
Liquidity Dynamics. In the presence of temporary shocks to κ, asset saleability fluctuates
with the asset price q, linking the quantitative and price dimensions of asset liquidity. The
asset price co-moves positively with asset saleability, as long as the latter is sufficiently small.
Corollary 2:
Suppose that the economy starts from the steady state with both private claims and money
and suppose (A1) holds. In response to a temporary increase of κ, q can drop together with
φ if [
M
(
1,
(1− ω)ρ∗
ω
)] 1
1−η
≤ (1− ω) ξ
1
1−η
2ω(1− η)
1− 2η + η
M
(
1, (1−ω)ρ
∗
ω
)
 . (A2)
When η = 1
2
, the above sufficient condition simplifies to ξ1/3
(
1−ω
ω
)1/6
(ρ∗)1/2 ≤ 2−1/3.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Again, this result reflects the reaction of supply relative to demand on the asset search
market. On the one hand, a drop in asset saleability due to a lower demand from investors
tightens entrepreneurs’ financing constraints, which reduces the supply of private claims and
aggregate investment, but raises the MPK, thus exerting upward pressure on the asset price
q. On the other hand, given the existence of the money market, investors rebalance towards
money to hedge against future liquidity risks. This, again, raises the liquidity premium of
private claims and pushes down q.
Proposition 2 shows that the demand (or liquidity-premium) effect dominates the supply
(or MPK) effect under assumption (A2). Our model can thus generate simultaneous falls in
the asset price and asset saleability, thereby endogenously tightening financing constraints
through both the quantity and price dimensions of liquidity.
In sum, the cost, the quantity, and the price aspects of asset liquidity are linked through
the participation decisions of sellers and buyers on the asset search market and jointly give
rise to the liquidity premium ∆LP . These results above highlight the importance of modeling
asset saleability as an endogenous market outcome, rather than an exogenous constraint.
Remark: In Shi (2015) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), asset saleability φ is an ex-
24
ogenous parameter and constrains entrepreneurs, such that asset demand is only a (fixed)
clearing factor. When φ falls, the asset supply schedule shifts to the left, while demand is
not directly affected. Therefore, a drop of φ pushes up the asset price q in these models. In
our model, a drop of φ reflects a simultaneous left-shift of both asset supply and demand.
The main message of our paper can thus be summarized as follows: when financial markets
are less liquid, asset prices fall as long as the increase of the liquidity premium dominates the
fall of asset supply. This result is reflected both in the steady state and dynamic properties
of the model.
Remark: The drop of both φ and q reduces aggregate investment I =
[r+φqi(1−δ)]Si+BiP −Ci
1−φqi
in (22) via two channels. First, it reduces the saleable part of existing assets, thus shrinking
the numerator. Second, it tightens the financing constraints and restricts entrepreneurs’
ability to leverage, thus increasing the denominator. These effects are at the heart of the
macro-financial interactions discussed in the numerical simulations in Section 6.
4.2 The Existence of Private and Public Liquidity
The circulation of different types of assets is important, since the liquidity premium only
matters when both assets exist. When both types of assets exist, a higher degree of search
frictions drives demand away to liquid assets and asset price can fall. In contrast, when
only private claims circulate a higher degree of search frictions does not lead to a fall of the
asset price q or asset saleability φ, simply because investors lack an alternative asset class to
rebalance their portfolios toward.
As shown below, the different types of equilibrium are closely linked to the severity
of liquidity frictions parameterised by intermediation costs κ. The modified equilibrium
conditions can be found in Appendix A.3. Intuitively, one would conjecture the existence of
two thresholds for the steady state level of intermediation costs, which separate these types
of equilibrium and characterise the existence of private and public liquidity.
First, between the two thresholds, private claims and money co-exist, and we know that
search market tightness θ¯ = 1−ω
ω
ρ∗ in the private asset market is uniquely determined. Also,
asset saleability φ¯ = M(1, θ¯) is unique. Because of this feature, our asset search model
does not feature multiple stationary equilibria when private claims and money co-exist, in
contrast to, e.g., Rocheteau and Wright (2013).
Second, private claims will only be created if intermediation costs are not too large.
To see this, note that the ask price for private claims must (weakly) exceed the internal
replacement cost, q¯i = q¯− κ
φ¯
≥ 1 for private claims to exist. Otherwise, entrepreneurs would
only resort to internal financing. Moreover, q¯ is bounded from below by zero and must be
bounded from above as total resources of buyers are limited. Therefore, a threshold κ = κ2
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must exist such that q¯i = 1. Any value of intermediation costs in excess of this threshold
would push the ask price q¯i to below unity, and entrepreneurs would prefer to self-finance.
Third, for public liquidity (money) to exist, intermediation costs cannot be too small.
Otherwise, money would not be valued, because private claims would provide sufficient
liquidity by themselves and dominate the return of money (which is Π¯−1 = 1).
Proposition 3:
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state. Then, there are three types of non-autarky
equilibrium, depending on the level of intermediation costs κ:
1. Non-monetary equilibrium. For κ ∈ [0, κ1), public liquidity is not valued, such that
only private liquidity exists. In this case, we have q¯n > q¯ > q¯i ≥ 1 ≥ q¯r. Moreover,
risk sharing ρ¯ satisfies 1 < ρ¯ < ρ¯∗, but deteriorates with κ, i.e., ∂ρ¯
∂κ
> 0. Asset
saleability increases with κ, i.e., ∂φ¯
∂κ
> 0; asset price q¯ can increase or decrease with κ
even if (A1) holds.
2. Co-existence. Both types of financial assets exist if and only if κ satisfies κ ∈ [κ1, κ2],
where κ2 and κ1 are defined as
κ2 ≡ ρ
∗ − 1
1−ω
ω
ρ∗ + 1
M
(
1,
1− ω
ω
ρ∗
)
, κ1 ≡ max{0, κ˜1}, κ˜1 = H(χ, β, δ, α, ξ, η, ω)
and H is some non-linear function specified in Appendix B.5. Asset prices satisfy
q¯n > q¯ > q¯i ≥ 1 ≥ q¯r and the degree of risk-sharing is given by ρ¯ = ρ∗ > 1; The asset
saleability φ¯ = M
(
1, 1−ω
ω
ρ∗
)
.
3. Pure monetary equilibrium. For κ ∈ [κ2,+∞), private liquidity is not issued, such
that only public liquidity exists. In this case, ρ¯ = ρ∗ > 1 and φ¯ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
When κ < κ1, financial frictions are less severe, thus implying improved risk-sharing
than in the region of κ ≥ κ1. Therefore, ρ¯ < ρ∗. An increase of κ within the region [0, κ1)
impairs risk-sharing, such that ρ¯ increases while asset saleability φ¯ needs to rise in order to
encourage sellers’ participation in the search market. The asset price q¯ can also increase,
reflecting the shortage of supply. In such a non-monetary equilibrium, intermediation costs
act like capital-adjustment costs. Notice that φ¯ is flat when κ1 ≤ κ ≤ κ2 and is zero
when κ ≥ κ2. Therefore, endogenising asset market liquidity implies a non-linear and non-
monotone relationship between search frictions and asset saleability.
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Figure 1: Different Types of Equilibrium. The different types of equilibrium are differentiated
by the level of intermediation costs κ and the degree of risk-sharing ρ. The latter measures the difference
between the marginal utility of consumption of an entrepreneur relative to a worker.
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Notice further that there are two equilibria at the upper threshold κ2. When κ1 ≤ κ ≤ κ2,
q¯i falls with κ to q¯i = 1. When κ ≥ κ2, entrepreneurs are strongly financing constrained, but
the benefits of outside financing cannot compensate the costs of transacting private financial
assets anymore. Therefore, in this region, the entrepreneurs value capital at q¯i = 1. At κ =
κ2, both the case in which entrepreneurs participate in the financial market and the opposite
case could be equilibrium outcomes. However, more wealth will be accumulated if private
claims circulate; once private claims cease to be traded, only low-yielding money provides
liquidity, and the economy becomes less efficient. We will illustrate this dis-continuity with
numerical examples in Section 5.
In summary, the level of intermediation costs κ and the degree of risk-sharing ρ¯ jointly
characterise different types of equilibrium as shown in Figure 1. The two polar cases in these
dimensions are the equilibrium of a basic RBC model and the autarky equilibrium. When
ρ¯ = 1, money is not valued, and the full-insurance economy resembles a RBC economy.1617
In contrast, an autarky economy features no risk-sharing due to the absence of any asset
markets, such that ρ¯ > ρ∗.
5 Calibration
In order to illustrate the analytical results of our model, we calibrate the model to the
U.S. economy using data on macroeconomic aggregates and financial markets. In Section
6, we use this calibrated version of the model to evaluate its dynamic features in response
16In this case, the household budget constraint (33) becomes C + K+1 = wN + [r + (1− δ)]K, which
resembles the budget constraint in a basic RBC model.
17The absence of intermediation costs, κ = 0, is not sufficient for the steady state asset price to be one. It
only implies qn = qi. Entrepreneurs will still be financing constrained as there are uninsured labour income
risks. Money may or may not be valued depending on whether κ˜1 ≥ 0.
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to aggregate productivity and intermediation cost shocks. We choose a conventional CRRA
utility function of consumption and a linear function for the dis-utility of labour:18
u(c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ and h(n) = µn.
5.1 Targets
We calibrate the steady state to match several long-run characteristics of the U.S. economy.
The parameters capturing the discount factor, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and
the depreciation rate of capital (β, σ, and δ), are set exogenously to standard values. The
capital share of output α and the weight of labour supply µ in the utility function are set
to target the investment-to-GDP ratio and working hours (Table 2). Note that GDP in the
model corresponds to the sum of real private consumption (Ct) and real private investment
(It+κtUt+κtVt). Using this definition, we obtain an investment-to-GDP ratio of about 20%
based on quarterly data from 1971Q1 to 2014Q4 from the FRED data set.
Table 2: Steady state calibration
Parameter Baseline Value Target/Source
Preferences and Production Technology
Household discount factor β 0.9850 Exogenous
Relative risk aversion σ 2 Exogenous
Utility weight on leisure µ 2.6904 Working time: 33%
Mass of entrepreneurs χ 0.0540 Doms and Dunne (1998)
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.0250 Exogenous
Capital share of output α 0.3750 Investment-to-GDP ratio: 20%
Search and Matching
Supply sensitivity of matching η 0.5000 Exogenous
Matching efficiency ξ 0.2695 Saleability φ = 0.3000
Bargaining weight ω 0.5085 Tobins q = 1.1500
Search costs κ 0.0216 Liquidity/GDP = 30.1%
There are four less conventional parameters {ξ, η, κ, ω} related to the asset search-market
and one parameter χ that is related to idiosyncratic investment risks. The population share
of entrepreneurs χ, can be interpreted as the fraction of firms, which adjust capital in each
period. According to Doms and Dunne (1998), this fraction is about 20% annually in the
U.S., which translates to a value of χ = 0.054 at quarterly frequency (Shi (2015) also uses a
similar value). ξ and η are not independent due to the constant returns to scale matching
technology on the search market. Without loss of generality, we set η = 0.5 and calibrate ξ.
18This dis-utility function facilitates the steady state solution. The main results are robust to a more
complicated specification. See the discussion in the calculation of steady-state values in the Appendix.
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We are then left with three parameters {ξ, κ, ω}, which are calibrated to jointly match
three targets: The asset price q captures Tobin’s q (excluding transaction costs), which
ranges from 1.1 to 1.21 in the U.S. economy according to COMPUSTAT data. We target
a value of q = 1.15. Steady-state asset saleability φ is set to 0.30, which corresponds to
the ratio of funds raised in the market to fixed investment in the U.S. flow-of-funds data.19
Finally, as κ = 0 is likely to generate an equilibrium without the existence of money, we
calibrate κ such that the ratio of liquid assets to GDP, i.e. the real value of public liquidity
divided by GDP, B
PY
, is 30.1% in the steady state. In the data, this number is identified
as the ratio of the total amount of money-like assets, such as cash, checkable deposits, and
short-term Treasury bills (all from the flow-of-funds data), divided by GDP.
These calibration targets imply that intermediation costs are only about 2% of total
GDP, and the annualized liquidity premium is about 106 basis points in line with previous
empirical studies (e.g., Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2007).
5.2 The Long-run Quantitative Impact of Intermediation Costs
With the above parameters’ choice, the conditions set out in Corollary 1 and Proposition 3
are satisfied. Using this calibration, we trace steady-state intermediation costs κ over the
positive domain to illustrate the quantitative impacts of κ on financial markets and macro
variables (see Figure 2). The two critical thresholds for intermediation costs, which separate
the non-autarky equilibria, are
κ1 = 0.0054 and κ2 = 0.0378.
Non-monetary Equilibrium. When κ ∈ [0, 0.0054), only private claims exist as they
provide sufficient liquidity to dominate money. Recall that the absence of intermediation
costs (κ = 0) is not equivalent to a basic RBC economy, as investment opportunities and
labour income risk are still not fully insurable. As a result, the steady-state capital stock
of a model with search frictions characterizing financial markets is 7% lower than the RBC
level even if κ = 0. Lower capital accumulation reduces the marginal product of labour, such
that demand for labour drops. Lower factor input depresses output to about 82% of that in
a basic RBC model, while consumption drops by 2%.
As κ increases from 0 to κ1, ρ rises from 1.26 to ρ
∗ = 1.282. That is, the risk-sharing
capacity of the economy deteriorates increasingly in intermediation costs as transferring funds
via the search market becomes more costly. However, in this region intermediation costs are
19Nezafat and Slavik (2010) use the US flow-of-funds data for non-financial firms to estimate the stochastic
process of φ. The long-run average is also close to 0.30.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics. Consumption, investment, and output are expressed as
percentages of the corresponding quantities in a frictionless model, i.e., a basic RBC model
(for details see Appendix A.4). The liquidity share of output is defined as L/Y and the
intermediation-cost-to-output ratio as κ(U + V )/Y (intermediation share of output). The
bold vertical line indicates the calibrated level of intermediation costs κ, while the dash-
dotted line represents the lower threshold κ1 and the dashed line the upper threshold κ2.
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still small enough for money not to be valued, such that the liquidity share of output L/Y
is zero. Asset saleability φ increases with ρ in order to encourage sellers’ participation in the
search market as captured by (31). Asset prices q and qn increase with search costs, reflecting
the tighter financing constraints. Thus, search costs act like investment adjustment costs
that consume resources, in response to which investment, consumption, and production fall.
Private and Public liquidity. When κ ∈ [0.0054, 0.0378], the liquidity of private claims
- as captured by the combination of steady-state asset saleability and transaction costs -
falls sufficiently, such that money is valued and circulates in addition to private claims.
The hedging value of money increases with κ. The liquidity share of output thus increases
monotonically with search costs from 0% to 54%. In contrast to the region [0, κ1), the
equilibrium asset price q now decreases in intermediation costs, as demand for private claims
falls more strongly than supply, reflecting the theoretical results in Corollary 1. That is,
Assumption (A1) is satisfied.
As intermediation costs increase from κ1 to κ2, capital stock, output and consump-
tion drop, respectively, by about 20, 8, and 6 percentage points compared to a frictionless
economy. The under-accumulation of capital and the associated fall in production and con-
sumption, are driven by two effects: first, agents rebalance their portfolios towards money as
intermediation costs increase. However, money delivers a smaller return than capital. Sec-
ond, higher trading costs imply a larger resource loss per transaction of private claims. Both
effects reduce entrepreneurs’ net worth, thus limiting their capacity to create new capital.
Note that the macroeconomic impact is brought about by a mere increase of intermedi-
ation costs from about 1% to 4.8% of output. The strong impact of intermediation costs on
real allocations points to sizeable amplification.
Purely Monetary Equilibrium. When κ ∈ [0.0378,+∞), only money circulates and ρ is
still equal to ρ∗. As the private asset market are shut down, entrepreneurs cannot finance in-
vestment projects by issuing or re-selling claims, i.e., φ = 0. Therefore, financing constraints
tighten abruptly when intermediation costs cross the threshold κ2, inducing a downward
jump in investment and the steady-state capital stock. Output declines by another 4.5% of
the RBC level, as a result. Since money is the only available means for risk-sharing purposes,
demand for money soars and the liquidity share of output increases to about 380%. Once
private asset markets are inactive, intermediation costs are irrelevant for real allocations,
such that the long-run equilibrium becomes invariant to them.
The dis-continuity at κ = κ2 = 0.0378 reflects our previous discussion. The shutting down
of private asset market leads to much lower capital accumulation and, therefore, reduces
output significantly. Our calibration illustrates that even comparatively small increases in
intermediation costs (less than twice the calibrated level) can lead to a complete shut-down
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of asset markets. This finding highlights the inherent fragility of financial markets with
endogenous participation similar to Gorton and Ordonez (2013).
6 Equilibrium Responses to Shocks
This section shows the model’s dynamics after (1) TFP shocks, and (2) shocks to the inter-
mediation capacity of financial markets, i.e., temporary changes of participation costs on the
asset search market. Importantly, we find that these two types of shocks generate opposite
liquidity premium dynamics; TFP shocks generate far less volatile asset price movements
than that in the data.
In order to focus on variation in the liquidity premium (first-order effects) and abstract
from the risk premium (second-order effects), we log-linearize the model.
6.1 TFP Shocks and Intermediation Cost Shocks
We consider a standard AR(1) process for aggregate productivity, i.e.,
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + At , 0 < ρA < 1
with i.i.d. At ∼ N(0, σ2A). We further introduce a shock to the cost of financial intermedia-
tion, which corresponds to a change in the participation costs
log(1 + κt) = ρκ log(1 + κt−1) + (1− ρκ) log(1 + κ) + κt , 0 < ρκ < 1
with i.i.d. κt ∼ N (0, σ2κ). Rather than affecting the production frontier of the economy,
this shock only impairs the capacity of the financial sector to intermediate funds between
workers and entrepreneurs. Both in a market and a banking context, such an increase in
intermediation costs may, for example, be triggered by rising uncertainty about counter-party
risk. Such shocks unfold their effects through the endogenous response of asset saleability
and prices, which affect entrepreneurs’ financing constraints, investment, and production.
To compare productivity and intermediation cost shocks, the persistence and standard
deviation of the underlying shock processes target the volatility (0.02) and first order cor-
relation (0.91) of GDP’s cyclical components (HP filtered with a smoothing coefficient of
1600). When using only productivity shocks, we have
ρA = 0.90 and σA = 0.008.
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When focusing on shocks to intermediation costs only, the exercise yields
ρκ = 0.82 and σκ = 0.012.
We use these parameters in the subsequent numerical simulations. By design, both shocks
will generate very similar aggregate output dynamics. We focus on the differences in the
paths of other variables.
Negative TFP Shocks. Suppose an adverse productivity shock hits the economy at time
0 (see At in Figure 3). This shock depresses the marginal product of capital and its value
to the household. Search for investment becomes less attractive and the amount of purchase
orders from workers drops. The demand-driven fall is reflected in the endogenous drop in
asset saleability φ, which amplifies the initial shock in two ways: (1) it reduces the quantity
of assets that entrepreneurs are able to sell; (2) the asset price, falls - though only modestly
- in line with Proposition 2. Both effects render private financial assets less liquid, thus
tightening entrepreneurs’ financing constraints. As a result, investment falls; consumption
also falls because fewer resources are produced at the lower level of aggregate productivity.
In principle, money’s liquidity service becomes more valuable to households when private
claims’ liquidity declines. However, in the case of a persistent TFP shock, lower expected
returns to capital make future investment less attractive. This effect weakens the incentive
to hedge against asset illiquidity for future investment. The former effect has a positive
impact on the liquidity premium, while the latter has a negative impact.
In our calibration, the decline in the profitability of investment projects is sufficient
for the liquidity premium to drop. Therefore, the demand for liquid assets falls, which is
reflected in the decrease of their price 1/Pt on impact and, conversely, a surge in inflation
Πt = Pt/Pt−1. To the extent that TFP reverts back to the steady state, while asset liquidity
is still subdued, hedging becomes more attractive which explains the relatively fast recovery
of the liquidity premium.
Intermediation Shocks. Suppose an increase of intermediation costs hits the economy at
time 0 (see the dynamics of κ in Figure 3). The output dynamics in this scenario are, by
construction, similar to those of the productivity shock.
Realizing that market participation is more costly now and later, households seek to
reduce their exposure to private claims, such that demand on the search market falls. On
the supply side, financing-constrained entrepreneurs would still like to sell as many assets
as possible in order to take full advantage of profitable investment opportunities. Therefore,
asset demand on the search market shrinks relative to supply, reducing the likelihood for
sellers’ quotes to be matched with buyers’ quotes and depressing asset saleability.
The sharp drop in asset liquidity tightens entrepreneurs’ financing constraints substan-
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Figure 3: Impulse responses after a standard deviation shock to TFP or interme-
diation search costs at time 0. Units of variables are percentage changes from their steady-state
levels.
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tially. Investment falls, and the MPK rises. But the liquidity premium dominates the
increase of the MPK. Hence, qt falls strongly and amplifies the initial shock by depressing
entrepreneurs’ net worth further. This effect is mirrored in a significant decline of investment
activity, the impact response of which is about 6 times stronger than that of output.
As saving via the financial market becomes more expensive with higher intermediation
costs, workers reduce their labour supply and consume slightly more after the initial shock.
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, have to cut back consumption significantly in view of
tightly binding financing constraints. Given the small population share of entrepreneurs,
aggregate consumption increases slightly initially, while output falls on impact because of
the drop of labour hours. However, lower investment into the capital stock soon reduces
the marginal product of labour and the wage rate. As labour income of workers falls,
consumption persistently drops below the steady state.
While the intermediation cost shock depresses the demand for and the liquidity of private
assets, it substantially increases their hedging value. To see this, note that future investment
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remains profitable since the productivity of capital is not affected by the shock. To take ad-
vantage of future investment opportunities, households seek to hedge against the persistent
illiquidity of private claims by expanding their holdings of public liquidity. The additional
demand increases the real price of money, 1/Pt, on impact, such that inflation Πt = Pt/Pt−1
drops. Therefore, the liquidity premium initially falls due to the “flight to liquidity”. How-
ever, once the real value of liquid assets has adjusted, the higher valuation of money relative
to private assets leads to a persistent rise in the liquidity premium.
The faster accumulation of public liquidity relaxes future financing constraints, as en-
trepreneurs can finance more out of their stock of liquid assets and buyers have more resources
to buy private claims. Both effects improve liquidity conditions on the private asset market.
That is why both the asset price and asset saleability overshoot above the steady-state levels
after about 3 years.
6.2 Business Cycle Statistics
The equilibrium dynamics confirm two key results: (1) In order to reconcile declining asset
saleability with falling asset prices, the former must be an endogenous phenomenon. In
other words, φt must be a consequence, rather than a cause of economic disturbances. (2)
Both standard productivity and intermediation cost shocks affect the hedging value of liquid
assets. However, only the latter generate a negative co-movement between the liquidity
premium and aggregate output. In light of these findings, we further compare the data with
the model’s predictions for the cyclical behaviour of macroeconomic and financial variables.
We use the Wilshire 5000 price full cap index from 1971Q1-2014Q4 as a proxy for q, as
it covers a vast universe of traded stocks. An aggregate measure of asset liquidity, on the
other hand, is more difficult to construct due to the various dimensions of asset liquidity and
associated measurement issues. For instance, transaction costs and trading delays depend
on many factors such as the size of a trade relative to market depth, its timing, and the
market structure.
In order to condense these characteristics of asset markets in a single indicator, we follow
Naes, Skjeltorp, and Odegaard (2011), in choosing a simple and popular proxy for the
illiquidity of private claims and money-like government issued assets suggested by Amihud
(2002). This measure can be easily obtained from quarterly, monthly, or even daily data and
is constructed as an illiquidity ratio (ILR) as follows:
ILRi,T =
∑T
t=1
|Ri,t|
V OLi,t
DT
where DT is the number of trading days within a time window T , |Ri,t| is the absolute return
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on day t for an asset i, and V OLi,t is the trading volume (in units of currency) on date t.
The ILR captures the price impact per volume unit of trades for a security i, thus
combining the price and volume dimensions of asset liquidity. Liquid assets are traded in
deep markets characterized by large transaction volumes and low price volatility. Therefore,
liquid assets are associated with a low ILR, while the opposite is true for illiquid assets.
In our model, the different liquidity properties of privately and publicly issued assets are
collapsed into the liquidity premium. As we do not directly observe the liquidity premium in
the data, we construct an illiquidity difference measure as the empirical counterpart for the
model-implied premium. This measure is computed as the difference between the illiquidity
ratio for private claims ILRPT and the corresponding ratio for money-like assets ILR
M
T , i.e.,
ILRDT = ILR
P
T − ILRMT .
To calculate the illiquidity difference measure, we use data on stock prices, returns, and
trading volume. We use quarterly averages of monthly data obtained from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Furthermore, we obtain an aggregate illiquidity ratio
ILRPT as the equally weighted average of cross-sectional ILRi,T measures. Note that we
restrict attention to stocks listed at the NYSE to keep the sample as homogenous as possible.
We use a similar strategy to compute the illiquidity ratio ILRMT for 3-month Treasury bills.
We de-trend all time series with the HP filter (with a smoothing coefficient of 1600).
Asset prices tend to fall in recessions, while our illiquidity difference measure increases,
possibly reflecting portfolio rebalancing towards liquid assets (Figure 4). Not surprisingly,
the illiquidity difference measure correlates negatively with GDP (-0.67), while asset prices
correlate positively with GDP (0.51).
Some key business cycle statistics of the model in comparison to the data are reported in
Table 3, where only TFP shocks are considered. Similar to a basic RBC model, consumption
and investment volatility, the correlation of macroeconomic variables with GDP, and first-
order autocorrelations are roughly in line with the data. However, the liquidity premium and
the asset price move too little in the model. Besides, the model-implied positive correlation
between the liquidity premium and GDP (0.78) is at odds with the data (-0.67). All these
statistics confirm the results gleaned from the impulse responses to TFP shocks.
As a comparison, Table 4 shows the relevant statistics associated with intermediation
cost shocks as the only exogenous disturbance. Compared to the previous case, the volatility
of both the liquidity premium and the asset price increase substantially. In addition, the
volatility of investment is closer to the data, while consumption becomes more volatile.
Importantly, the model with shocks to intermediation costs successfully generates coun-
tercyclical liquidity premium (correlation with GDP: -0.50), mimicking the deterioration of
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Figure 4: Cyclical components of the illiquidity difference measure, asset prices,
and GDP. All series are cyclical components of HP filtered original series times 100. The shaded areas
are NBER dated recessions.
Table 3: Business cycle statistics with only TFP shocks
Relative volatility σxσy Correlation ρ(x, y) 1st auto-correlation
Variable x Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 0.02 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91
Consumption 0.58 0.66 0.93 0.98 0.89 0.94
Investment 3.21 2.26 0.95 0.98 0.86 0.89
Liquidity premium 9.31 6.62 -0.67 0.78 0.92 0.87
Asset Price 4.88 0.70 0.51 0.82 0.81 0.87
private assets’ liquidity relative to publicly issued assets typically observed in recessions. As
a result, the liquidity premium can serve as a discriminant between the sources of recessions.
In addition, the asset price is more volatile, and its correlation with GDP (0.58) is closer
to the data (0.51). Due to the overshooting of the asset price illustrated in Figure 3, this
correlation is substantially smaller than that in the model with only TFP shocks (0.82) .
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Table 4: Business cycle statistics with only intermediation cost shocks
Relative volatility σxσy Correlation ρ(x, y) 1st auto-correlation
Variable x Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 0.02 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.91
Consumption 0.58 0.82 0.93 0.48 0.89 0.97
Investment 3.21 3.86 0.95 0.78 0.86 0.80
Liquidity premium 9.31 13.03 -0.67 -0.50 0.92 0.97
Asset Price 4.88 2.64 0.51 0.58 0.81 0.79
6.3 Discussion
We discuss a number of key determinants of these dynamics in greater detail in this section.
Hedging Value of Money. While rising intermediation costs increase the hedging value of
money as shown in Section 6.1, TFP shocks may have an ambiguous effect on the incentive
to hold cash. Persistently low productivity diminishes the return on capital, such that
investment becomes less profitable and the willingness to hedge idiosyncratic investment
risks shrinks. At the same time, low productivity depresses entrepreneurs’ net worth, such
that financing constraints become more binding. This effect should raise the hedging motive
and the willingness to hold money. In the baseline experiment in Figure 3, the first effect
dominates the second effect, such that the liquidity premium contracts strongly.
However, as both effects crucially depend on the persistence of the low-productivity spell,
we illustrate the sensitivity of the net effect by varying the persistence of the productivity
shock, by +10% and -10% compared to the baseline calibration. After changing the persis-
tence of shocks, the equilibrium dynamics are similar to the baseline simulation (Figure 5).
But different degrees of persistence alter the magnitude and the speed of the adjustment of
macroeconomic and financial variables.
When the productivity process is more persistent than in the baseline scenario, agents
anticipate that their net worth will be persistently lower, such that financing constraints will
remain tight for longer. As a result, the hedging value of money rises, and the liquidity pre-
mium contracts less in the first few quarters after the initial shock. In fact, households curtail
their consumption compared to the baseline scenario, in order to accumulate money hold-
ings and buffer investment on impact. Thereafter, higher cash reserves help entrepreneurs
finance investment and workers purchase private claims, which prevents output, investment,
saleability, and the asset price from dropping as much as in the baseline. Naturally, the
economy takes longer to revert back to the steady state from these less compressed levels
due to the high persistence of the TFP shock.
Endogenous Asset Saleability. Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Shi (2015) consider aggre-
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Figure 5: Impulse responses after a standard deviation shock to TFP at time 0.
The units of liquidity premium are annualized changes in basis points. Units of other variables are percentage
changes from their steady-state levels.
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gate liquidity shocks in the form of an exogenous and persistent reduction of asset saleability
φ. This shock mechanically depresses the supply of private assets on financial markets by
tightening entrepreneurs’ financing constraints. Demand for private claims, on the other
hand, is hardly affected by such a shock as the return on capital goods does not fall. As
supply contracts relative to demand on the asset market, such adverse aggregate liquidity
shocks have the unrealistic feature of generating asset price booms. In other words, tighter
financing constraints implies a higher value of Tobin’s q.
In contrast, we demonstrate that financial shocks need to strongly affect the demand side
of the asset market in order to overturn this anomaly in the reaction of the asset prices. In
our model environment, higher intermediation costs directly deter buyers from participating
in the asset search market. As a result the average size of their bid quotes declines. This
slump in asset demand is amplified by the persistence of intermediation cost shocks: buyers,
who perceive financial markets to be illiquid for an extended period, anticipate that holding
additional private financial assets may constrain their own funding ability in the future,
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thus becoming even less inclined to buy them. These demand side effects only occur with
endogenous asset saleability.20 That is why we consider shocks to the financial sector, instead
of shocks to the financing constraints directly.
Notice that we assume the entry costs for buyers and sellers are identical. More generally,
one could have different participation costs for buyers and sellers. Because sellers have
investment opportunities, they will still offer all their assets on sale. In this case, the above
results continue to hold as long as the costs levied on the buyers are large enough relative
to sellers .21
Investment-specific Technological Shocks. The financial shocks considered here are differ-
ent from productivity shocks, since they affect investment via financing constraints rather
than directly reducing the production frontier of the economy. To see this, recall the goods
market clearing condition (14)
C + I + κ (V + U) = Y.
Aggregate productivity shocks directly affect the RHS and then affect consumption and
investment on the LHS, while intermediation cost shocks directly affect the investment-
related costs κ (V + U) on the LHS and then affect labour supply and output on the RHS.
Such cost shocks may thus be interpreted as a particular form of non-linear investment-
specific technology shocks (e.g., Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman, 1988; Fisher, 2006;
Primiceri, Justiniano, and Tambalotti, 2010), whose impact is amplified by their effect on
endogenous market participation.
7 Conclusion
We endogenise asset liquidity in a macroeconomic model with search frictions. Endogenous
fluctuations of asset liquidity are triggered by shocks that affect asset demand and supply
on the search market either directly (intermediation cost shocks), or indirectly (productivity
shocks). By tightening entrepreneurs’ financing constraints, these shocks feed into real ac-
tivity. Agents hedge endogenous financing constraints arising from assets market illiquidity
with liquid assets. This idea harks back to Keynes’ speculative motive for cash balances
20An alternative financial market disturbance in our framework is a shock to the matching efficiency ξ. We
check whether an efficiency problem occurring in the financial sector could induce co-movement between the
asset price and asset saleability. An adverse efficiency shock, capturing, for example, a contagious bank run,
impairs the intermediation capacity of the financial sector. Nevertheless, such a shock triggers an increase in
the asset price as the supply reaction dominates. The detailed simulation results of the matching efficiency
shock are available upon request.
21Details are available from the authors upon request.
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(Keynes, 1936) and Tobin’s theory of risk-based liquidity preferences (Tobin, 1958, 1969).
Our model is able to capture several dimensions of asset liquidity. In particular, when
both private assets and money exist, we show that asset prices can positively co-move with
asset saleability when the liquidity-premium effect dominates the marginal-product of-capital
effect. The endogenous nature of asset liquidity is key to match this positive correlation, as
adverse exogenous liquidity shocks would raise marginal product of capital and lead to asset
price booms in recessions.
We also show that the liquidity service provided by intrinsically worthless liquid assets,
is higher when financing constraints bind tightly. As a result, shocks to the cost of financial
intermediation increase the hedging value of liquid assets, enabling our model to replicate the
flight-to-liquidity dynamics measured by a countercyclical liquidity premium, thus matching
U.S. business cycle features.
While it is straightforward to interpret our asset search framework as a model of market-
based financial intermediation, it can also be seen as a short-cut to modeling bank-based
intermediation: Financial intermediaries help channel funds from investors to suitable credi-
tors in need of outside funding, which resembles a matching process. Adding further texture
by explicitly accounting for intermediaries’ balance sheets would open interesting interactions
between liquidity cycles and financial sector leverage and maturity transformation.
Regarding government interventions, our framework suggests that, as in KM, open market
operations in the form of asset purchase programs can have real effects by easing liquidity
frictions. However, government demand may crowd out private demand due to congestion
externalities in an endogenous liquidity framework. Therefore, future research could focus
on the optimal design of conventional and unconventional monetary as well as fiscal policy
measures in the presence of illiquid asset markets.
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Appendices
A Equilibrium Conditions
A.1 Buyers’ and Sellers’ Surpluses
First, we show the impact of marginal transaction on private claim accumulation. We rewrite (8) as a
function of Mn and M i,
S+1 = (1− δ)Sn −Mn + (1− δ)Si + Ii −M i = (1− χ)(1− δ)S −Mn + 1− eφ
eφ
M i
since M i = φU = φe
[
χ(1− δ)S + Ii]. Then, we know that the marginal transaction’s impact on S+1:
∂S+1/∂M
n = −1 and ∂S+1/∂M i = (1− eφ)/eφ. Because Mn and M i denote selling, the partial derivatives
imply that workers bring back one unit of claims if the transaction is successful, while entrepreneurs bring
back (1 − eφ)/eφ units of claims if the transaction is successful. The difference arises from the fact that
entrepreneurs invest in physical capital after selling claims as instructed by the household.
Second, we show the impact of marginal transaction on consumption. For workers, we replace fV by
−Mn in the budget constraint (3)
Cn − qMn = wN + r(1− χ)S + (1− χ)B
P
− B
n
+1
P
− κV
At the time of bargaining, the costs of buy-quotes have been paid and the accumulation of liquid assets is
finished. Then, it is straightforward to see that ∂Cn/∂Mn = q. For entrepreneurs, we replace φU by M i in
the budget constraint (6) and use the fact that Ii = M i/eφ− χ(1− δ)S
Ci +
M i
eφ
− qM i = rχS + χ(1− δ)S + χB
P
− B
i
+1
Pt
− κU
We know that an additional successful match imply that they commit ∂Ii/∂M i = e−1φ−1 units of physical
investment, and it is straightforward to see that ∂Ci/∂M i = q − e−1φ−1.
A buyer’s surplus consists of the resources sacrificed today to acquire an additional unit of private assets
and the value of this additional unit of asset holdings to its household tomorrow. Then, a buyer’s surplus
amounts to
Jn(S,B; Γ) = −u′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
∂Cn
∂Mn
− β ∂S+1
∂Mn
E [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] (34)
= −u′
(
Cn
1− χ
)
q + βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] .
Note that search market participation costs are already sunk at the bargaining stage. However, search costs
are not ignored since households take them into account when determining optimal asset posting decisions
by workers and entrepreneurs. Similarly, a seller’s surplus is the marginal value to the household of an
additional match for entrepreneurs. The difference here is due to the fact that entrepreneurs, unlike workers,
need to implement physical investment after transaction again:
J i(S,B; Γ) = u′
(
Ci
χ
)
∂Ci
∂M i
+ β
∂S+1
∂M i
E [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] (35)
= u′
(
Ci
χ
)(
q − e−1φ−1)+ 1− eφ
eφ
βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ]
= u′
(
Ci
χ
)
q − βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ] + e−1φ−1
[
−u′
(
Ci
χ
)
+ βE [JS(S+1, B+1; Γ+1)|Γ]
]
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A.2 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Assume that private claims and money co-exist. We directly use u(c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ for exposition simplicity, but
other utility functions will give similar features. Using the fact that total consumption C = Cn + Ci and
(25), we know Cn = ρnC and Ci = ρiC, where
ρn ≡ 1− χ
1− χ+ ρ−1/σχ, ρ
i ≡ χρ
−1/σ
1− χ+ ρ−1/σχ
We further define the real liquidity as L ≡ BP−1 and substitute S = K. Given the aggregate state variables
Γ = (K,L,A, κ), we solve the equilibrium system(
K+1, L+1, C, I,N, ρ, ρ
i, ρn, φ, q, qi, qn, r, w,Π
)
together with the exogenous laws of motion of (A,κ). To solve for these 15 endogenous variables, we use the
following 15 equilibrium conditions obtained from the main text:
1. The representative household’s optimality conditions:
u′
(
ρnC
1− χ
)
w = h′
(
N
1− χ
)
(36)
ρn ≡ 1− χ
1− χ+ ρ−1/σχ (37)
ρi ≡ χρ
−1/σ
1− χ+ ρ−1/σχ (38)
1 = βEΓ
[
u′(ρn+1C+1)
u′(ρnC)
(χρ+1 + 1− χ) r+1 + (1− δ)
(
χρ+1 + (1− χ) qn+1
)
qn
]
(39)
1 = βEΓ
[
u′(ρn+1C+1)
u′(ρnC)
(χρ+1 + 1− χ)
Π+1
]
(40)
I =
[(
r + (1− δ)φqi)χK + χL]− ρiC
1− φqi (41)
2. Final goods producers:
r = αA
(
K
N
)α−1
and w = (1− α)A
(
K
N
)α
(42)
3. Market clearing:
(a) The household’s budget constraint:
(
ρρi + ρn
)
C + L+1 + q
nK+1 = wN +
[χρ+ (1− χ)]L
Π
+ [χρ+ (1− χ)] rK
+ [χρ+ (1− χ)qn] (1− δ)K (43)
(b) Capital accumulation: K+1 = (1− δ)K + I
(c) Given the matching function M(U, V ) = ξUηV 1−η
φ = ξ
[
(1− ω)ρ
ω
]1−η
(44)
(d) Asset Prices
q =
ρ
(
1 + κω
)− κf
1 + (ρ− 1)φ , q
i = q − κ
φ
, qn = q +
κ
ξ
1
1−η φ
η
η−1
(45)
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(e) Liquid assets in fixed supply (note: L = BP−1 and Π =
P
P−1
)
L+1 =
L
Π
(46)
The following illustrates the steady-state values of 15 variables when both private claims and money exist.
We also directly use h(n) = µn. In fact, no numerical solver is necessary because of this functional form.
However, this is not a crucial assumption, and we will explain the reason after computing the stead-state
values.
First, notice that market clearing for liquid assets implies that Π¯ = 1. Next, we use (40) to obtain
ρ¯ = χ−1
[
β−1 − (1− χ)] , (47)
and therefore
ρ¯n ≡ 1− χ
1− χ+ ρ¯−1/σχ, ρ¯
i ≡ χρ¯
−1/σ
1− χ+ ρ¯−1/σχ. (48)
With ρ¯, we know that
φ¯ = ξ
[
(1− ω)ρ¯
ω
]1−η
. (49)
Then, we can compute asset prices
q¯ =
ρ¯
(
1 + κω
)− κ
f¯
1 + (ρ¯− 1) φ¯ , q¯
i = q¯ − κ
φ¯
, q¯n = q¯ +
κ
ξ
1
1−η φ¯
η
η−1
. (50)
From (39) and (42), we have
r¯ =
q¯n
β − (1− δ) [χρ¯+ (1− χ) q¯n]
χρ¯+ 1− χ , (51)
w¯ = (1− α)
( r¯
α
) α
α−1
, C¯ =
(
w¯
µ
)1/σ
1− χ
ρ¯n
. (52)
Now, we need to solve real liquidity value L¯ and capital stock K¯. One can simplify (41) and (43) to be
ρ¯iC¯ + d¯K¯ = χL¯,
(ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n)C¯ =
[
(1− α)r¯
α
+ q¯n
(
β−1 − 1)] K¯ + χ(ρ¯− 1)L¯,
where we use the fact that I¯ = δK¯ and
d¯ = δ(1− φ¯q¯i)− χ(r¯ + (1− δ)φ¯q¯i). (53)
As a result, we can solve real liquidity and capital stock as
L¯ =
(
ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n
)
d¯+ ρ¯i
[
(1−α)r¯
α + q¯
n(β−1 − 1)
]
χ
[
(1−α)r¯
α + q¯
n(β−1 − 1) + (ρ¯− 1)d¯
] C¯, (54)
K¯ =
1
(1−α)r¯
α + q¯
n(β−1 − 1) + (ρ¯− 1)d¯
C¯. (55)
We finally express labour supply N¯ and (physical) investment as a function of K¯
N¯ =
( r¯
α
) 1
1−α
K¯ and I¯ = δK¯. (56)
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Remark: similar steps still go through with other types of u(.) and h(.). A different u(.) only changes
the computation of ρ¯i and ρ¯n. A different h(.) (especially a non-linear h(.)) modifies (52) to
C¯ = (u′)−1
h′
(
N¯
1−χ
)
w¯
 1− χ
ρ¯n
.
Therefore, we need to guess a value of N and check whether the guess is correct by using (54), (55), and
(56). For these reasons, the proofs later in Section B do not rely on a particular choice of u(.) and h(.).
A.3 Two Special Cases
When only money exists and when only private claims exist, we will show how to modify the equilibrium
conditions (36)-(46) when both money and private claims exist. For κ > 0, we know that entrepreneurs are
always financing constrained.
If only money exists, private claims does not circulate. Then, (39) is not included in the equilibrium
conditions. (44) is modified to
φ = 0,
and we should replace (45) to
qi = q = 1, qn = ρt.
When computing the steady-state equilibrium, we continue solving (47)-(56) and modify (49) and (50) to
φ¯ = 0, q¯i = q¯ = 1, q¯n = ρ¯.
If only private claims circulate, money is not valued. Therefore, we keep all the equilibrium conditions
(36)-(46), except the Euler equation for money holdings (40); we also need to add L+1 = 0. When computing
the steady-state equilibrium, we solve (48)-(56) (note: ρ is not pinned down by (47) any more), and we pick
a particular ρ¯ which yields L¯ = 0.
A.4 A Basic RBC Model
We briefly describe the corresponding basic RBC model relative to our model. As is well known, one can
solve the planner’s solution to a RBC model. The planner maximizes
V (K;A) = max
C,N,K+1
{
C1−σ − 1
1− σ − µN + βE [V (K+1;A+1)|A]
}
s.t. C +K+1 = AK
αN1−α + (1− δ)K (57)
where K is capital stock and A is aggregate productivity. The optimality conditions of labor supply and
capital accumulation are
(C)
−σ
(1− α)A (K/N)α = µ, (58)
1 = βE
[(
C+1
C
)−σ [
αA+ (K+/N+)
α−1
+ 1− δ
]
|A
]
. (59)
Therefore, equations (57), (58), and (59) solve (K+1, C,N) given the state variables (K,A). To calculate
the steady-state values, we substitute out capital-labour ratio K/N in (58) and (59), and we obtain
K¯
N¯
=
(
µC¯σ
1− α
) 1
α
, C¯ =
(
1− α
µ
) 1
σ
[
β−1 − (1− δ)
α
] α
(α−1)σ
.
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Therefore, from the social resources constraint (57) and by using the capital labour-ratio, we derive capital
and labour in the steady state as
K¯ =
[
β−1 − (1− δ)
α
− δ
]
C¯, N¯ =
[
β−1 − (1− δ)
α
− δ
]
C¯/
(
µC¯σ
1− α
) 1
α
.
B Proofs
B.1 Proposition 1
We first simplify the bargaining solution in (30) to
ω
ρ
(
q − 1φ
)
+ 1−φφ q
n
=
1− ω
qn − q ,
by using the first-order condition (24) and the risk-sharing condition (25) from the household. Then,
ω
κ
f
= (1− ω)
[
ρ
(
q − 1
φ
)
+
1− φqi
φ
(1− φ) qn
1− φqi
]
.
Using the definition ρ ≡ qnqr = (1−φ)q
n
1−φqn , we further simplify the above identity to (31)
ω
κ
f
= (1− ω) ρ (q − qi) ⇐⇒ ρ = ω
1− ω
φ
f
.
By using ρ = (1−φ)q
n
1−φqi =
(1−φ)(q+κf )
1−φq+κ again, we solve q as
q =
ρ (1 + κ)− (1− φ) κf
1 + (ρ− 1)φ =
ρ
(
1 + κω
)− κf
1 + (ρ− 1)φ , (60)
where the second equality uses (31) again.
B.2 Proposition 2
In the steady state, the two asset pricing formulae (40) and (39) become
ρ¯χr¯ni + (1− χ)r¯nn = β−1, ρ¯χ 1
Π¯
+ (1− χ) 1
Π¯
= β−1. (61)
Since Π¯ = 1, one knows that ρ¯ = ρ∗ =
[
β−1 − (1− χ)] /χ > 1. We will keep writing 1/Π¯ to highlight the
return on money.
Since q¯n > 1, we know that r¯nn = r¯+(1−δ)q¯
n
q¯n >
r¯+(1−δ)
q¯n = r¯
ni. As a result, r¯nn > 1; otherwise, the two
asset pricing formulae in (61) cannot simultaneous hold. Further, rearranging (61), we have
χr¯ni =
β−1 − (1− χ)r¯nn
ρ¯
, χ
1
Π¯
=
β−1 − (1− χ) 1
Π¯
ρ¯
,
which are used to express the liquidity premium ∆¯LP as
∆¯LP = χr¯ni + (1− χ)r¯nn − 1
Π¯
=
(
1− ρ¯−1)(r¯nn − 1
Π¯
)
(1− χ). (62)
Since ρ¯ > 1 and r¯nn > 1, we know that ∆¯LP > 0.
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B.3 Corollary 1
First, when both private claims and money exist, ρ¯ = ρ∗ and θ¯ = 1−ωω ρ¯ in the steady state. Then, we know
that ρ, φ(θ), and f(θ) are functions of parameters that are independent of search costs κ. We thus know
that the spread q¯n − q¯i = κ (φ¯−1 + f¯−1) increases with κ in steady states.
Second, q¯n = q¯ + κ
f¯
=
ρ¯(1+ κω )+(ρ¯−1)κθ¯
1+(ρ¯−1)φ¯ ; using again θ¯ =
1−ω
ω ρ¯, we know that q¯
n = ρ¯[1+κ(1+ρ¯(1−ω)/ω]1+(ρ¯−1)φ and
therefore q¯n increases with κ. As for liquidity premium, the key is to prove that r¯nn = [r¯ + (1− δ)q¯n] /q¯n
increases with κ; (62) thus implies that ∆¯LP increases with κ. To see this, we can solve the steady-state
level of MPK r¯ from (51)
r¯
q¯n
=
β−1 − (1− χ)(1− δ)− χρ¯(1− δ)/q¯n
χρ¯+ 1− χ .
As a result, r¯/q¯n increases with q¯n and thus increases with κ. Given r¯nn = r¯/q¯n + 1− δ, we know that r¯nn
increases with κ, and that is why the liquidity premium ∆¯LP is also an increasing function of κ.
Third, we prove that q¯i = q¯ − κ
φ¯
=
ρ¯+κ[ ρ¯ω−f¯−1−φ¯−1−(ρ¯−1)]
1+(ρ¯−1)φ¯ is a decreasing function of κ. This is because
ρ¯
ω − 1f¯ − 1φ¯ − (ρ¯− 1) ≤ 0, which is equivalent to
ρ¯(1− ω)
ω
− 1
f¯
≤ 1− φ¯
φ¯
⇐⇒ 1
f¯
(φ¯− 1) ≤ 1− φ¯
φ¯
,
where we use the relationship ρ = ω1−ω
φ
f . The inequality is then satisfied for any φ¯ ∈ [0, 1].
Finally, since q¯ =
ρ¯(1+ κω )−κf¯
1+(ρ¯−1)φ¯ , we know that
∂q¯
∂κ < 0 is equivalent to
ρ¯
ω
− 1
f¯
< 0 ⇐⇒ φ¯ < 1− ω ⇐⇒ M
(
1,
1− ω
ω
ρ∗
)
< 1− ω,
where we have used ρ = ω1−ω
φ
f again and φ = M(1, θ).
B.4 Corollary 2
Using ρ = ω1−ω θ, θ = φ/f , and φ = M(1, θ), we can express ρ =
ωM−1(φ)
(1−ω) and f =
φ
M−1(φ) . Therefore, q in
(60) can be written as
q =
ωM−1(φ)(1+ κω )
(1−ω) − κM
−1(φ)
φ
1 +
[
ωM−1(φ)
(1−ω) − 1
]
φ
=
M−1(φ) [(ω + κ)φ− (1− ω)κ]
ωφ2M−1(φ) + (1− ω)φ(1− φ) =
ωφ+ [φ− (1− ω)]κ
ωφ2 + (1− ω)f(1− φ) .
If φ falls with κ, we know that the numerator ωφ + [φ− (1− ω)]κ after the third equality sign has to fall
because φ < 1− ω. Then, we know that a sufficient condition for q to positively co-move with φ is that the
denominator, g(φ) = ωφ2 + (1− ω)f(1− φ), is a decreasing function of φ. Since
dg(φ)
dφ
= 2ωφ− (1− ω)η
1− η ξ
1
1−η φ
1
η−1 (1− φt)− (1− ω)ξ 11−η φ
η
η−1
= 2ωφ− (1− ω)η
1− η ξ
1
1−η φ
1
η−1 − (1− ω) (1− 2η)
1− η ξ
1
1−η φ
η
η−1
where we have used the fact that f = ξ
1
1−η φ
η
η−1 , we know dg(φ)dφ ≤ 0 is equivalent to
φ
1
1−η ≤ 1− ω
2ω(1− η)ξ
1
1−η
[
1− 2η + η
φ
]
.
If the economy starts with the steady state, φ¯ = M(1, (1−ω)ρ
∗
ω ) and we thus have a sufficient condition
with only exogenous parameters as in the main text. When η = 1/2, the above inequality becomes φ¯ =
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ξ
(
1−ω
ω ρ
∗)1/2 ≤ ξ 23 [ 1−ω2ω ] 13 , or ξ1/3 ( 1−ωω )1/6 (ρ∗)1/2 ≤ 2−1/3.
B.5 Proposition 3
We first compute the two thresholds κ2 and κ1 and use a guess-and-verify strategy. We start by assuming
that private claims and money co-exist so that all the steady-state equilibrium conditions (47)-(56) are
satisfied.
First, we search for the threshold κ2 that yields q¯
i ≥ 1 when κ ≤ κ2. Using the asset price derived in
Proposition 1, the selling price qi = q − κφ , and the relationship ρ = ω1−ω φf , we know that
qi =
ρ(1 + κω )− κf − κφ − (ρ− 1)κ
1 + (ρ− 1)φ =
ρ+ κ (φ− 1) ( 1φ + 1f )
1 + (ρ− 1)φ . (63)
Therefore, qi ≥ 1 is equivalent to
(1− φ)
(
ρ− 1− κ
f
− κ
φ
)
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ρ− 1 ≥ κ
f
+
κ
φ
=
κ (θ + 1)
M(1, θ)
,
where we have used the fact that φ ∈ [0, 1] together with the definition of f and φ. By using again the
relationship ρ = ω1−ω θ, we can simplify the above condition to
κ ≤ ρ− 1ω
1−ωρ+ 1
M
(
1,
ω
1− ωρ
)
.
Notice that ρ = ρ¯ = ρ∗ = [β−1 − (1 − χ)]/χ in the steady state (again, ρ∗ is pinned down from the asset
pricing formula of money in the steady state); further, ρ−1ω
1−ω ρ+1
and M(1, ω1−ωρ) are increasing functions of ρ.
Therefore, we know that the threshold κ2 =
ρ∗−1
ω
1−ω ρ
∗+1M
(
1, ω1−ωρ
∗
)
. When κ = κ2, q¯
i = 1 in the steady-state
economy when both prviate claims and money exist.
Second, we calculate the threshold κ1 as a function of exogenous parameters. The key is to find κ1
such that the real value of liquidity L¯ = 0. From (47) and (49), ρ¯ = ρ∗ and we know that φ¯ and f¯ are not
functions of κ in the steady state. In addition, we have calculated qi in (63) and can also calculate qn:
q¯i =
ρ¯+ κ
(
φ¯− 1) ( 1
φ¯
+ 1
f¯
)
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ , q¯
n = q¯i +
κ
φ¯
+
κ
f¯
=
ρ¯+ κ
[
ρ¯
ω +
(ρ¯−1)φ¯
f¯
]
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ .
As a result,
q¯i = ci1 + κci2, q¯
n = cn1 + κcn2, (64)
where coefficients
ci1 =
ρ¯
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ , ci2 = −
(
1− φ¯) ( 1
φ¯
+ 1
f¯
)
φ¯
[
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯] , cn1 = ρ¯1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ , cn2 =
ρ¯
ω +
(ρ¯−1)φ¯
f¯
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ .
By inspecting these coefficients, we know that except ci2 < 0, others are strictly positive. For similar reasons,
we can express r from (51) as
r = cr1 + κcr2, (65)
where
cr1 =
[1− β(1− δ)(1− χ)] ρ¯
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ − β(1− δ)χρ¯, cr2 =
[1− β(1− δ)(1− χ)] ( ρ¯ω + (ρ¯−1)φ¯f¯ )
1 + (ρ¯− 1)φ¯ > 0.
Since money exists, L¯ ≥ 0 from (54) in equilibrium. The denominator of equation (54) has to be positive.
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Then, L¯ ≥ 0 iff (ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n) d¯+ ρ¯i [ (1−α)r¯α + q¯n(β−1 − 1)] ≥ 0. That is,
δ(1− φ¯q¯i) +
ρ¯i
[
(1−α)r¯
α + q¯
n(β−1 − 1)
]
(ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n)
≥ χ(r¯ + (1− δ)φ¯q¯i),
or, [
ρ¯i
(ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n)
(1− α)
α
− χ
]
r¯ +
ρ¯i
(
β−1 − 1) q¯n
(ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n)
− φ¯ [δ + χ(1− δ)] q¯i + δ ≥ 0.
Let ζr =
[
ρ¯i
(ρ¯ρ¯i+ρ¯n)
(1−α)
α − χ
]
, ζn =
ρ¯i(β−1−1)
(ρ¯ρ¯i+ρ¯n) , and ζi = φ¯ [δ + χ(1− δ)], then we can use the expressions qi,
qn, and r from (64) and (65) to derive:
κ (ζrcr2 + ζncn2 − ζici2) ≥ −δ − ζrcr1 − ζncn1 + ζici1.
Notice that ζr = χ
[
1
χρ¯+(1−χ)/ρ¯σ
1−α
α − 1
]
> χ
[
β−1 1−αα − 1
]
> 0, ζn > 0, and ζi > 0 , and we must have
ζrcr2 + ζncn2 − ζici2 > 0. This implies that κ˜1can be solved as
κ ≥ −δ − ζrcr1 − ζncn1 + ζici1
ζrcr2 + ζncn2 − ζici2 = H(χ, β, δ, α, ξ, η, ω) ≡ κ˜1.
Finally, by using the expression (54) and other equilibrium conditions, one can show that dL¯dκ > 0 and L¯ < 0
for a sufficiently small κ. That is, L¯(κ) is an increasing function of κ, or liquidity value increases with search
costs κ. This fact implies that liquidity value L¯ only cross zero once at κ = κ˜1. When κ < κ˜1, L(κ) < 0 and
the assumption of co-existence of private claims and money is not verified.
Now, we have κ1 and κ2, and we are left to characterise the economy when κ ∈ [κ2,+∞) and κ ∈ [0, κ1).
When κ ∈ [κ2,+∞), money is valued and ρ¯ = ρ∗, while φ¯ = 0. When κ ∈ [0, κ1), we know that workers do
not hold money and Bn+1 = 0. Therefore, the asset pricing formula needs to be modified to
βEΓ
[
u′(ρn+1C+1)
u′(ρnC)
(χρ+1 + 1− χ)
Π+1
]
+ ν = 0,
where ν > 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to Bn+1 ≥ 0. In the steady state, one can still imagine that
a government promises to pay return Π¯ = 1 on money, but no one is willing to hold such low-yielding asset.
Then, ρ¯ increases to ρ∗ as ν decreases to zero (when κ increases to κ1). As a result, φ¯ = ξ
(
(1−ω)ρ¯
ω
)1−η
is
also an increasing function of κ. Finally, in order to solve ρ¯ in this region, we can set L¯ = 0 in (54). That
is, ρ¯ solves the following equation
(
ρ¯ρ¯i + ρ¯n
)
d¯+ ρ¯i
[
(1− α)r¯
α
+ q¯n(β−1 − 1)
]
= 0,
where all variables can be expressed as a function of ρ¯ if we use equilibrium conditions (48)-(56). Finally,
the rising κ can increase or decrease q¯ = ρ¯+κ(ρ¯/ω−1/f¯)
1+(ρ¯−1)φ¯ since ρ¯ increases with κ even if Assumption (A1)
holds. This is different from the proof in Corollary B.3 in which ρ¯ is fixed at ρ∗ when both private claims
and money exist.
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